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Abstract 
In recent years, several Dutch quasi-autonomous government organizations (quangos) 
performed badly, which either resulted in the designated minister or undersecretary resigning, 
or in a reduction of autonomies of the quango. We analyzed four cases – ProRail, the Tax 
Administration, the Schiphol-fire and the pgb-debacle – in order to get insight in what role the 
parliament (which has a controlling function) played in the decision(s) to employ these far-
reaching political or organizational changes. To get insight in the principal-agent relations 
between parliament, minister and quango, along with specific characteristics of ministers, we 
conducted a qualitative, in-depth document analysis of important political debates in each 
case. We found that the role of the parliament is limited in the process of ministerial turnover, 
as well as in the process of de-autonomization. Ministerial characteristics, such as 
performance during debates and the minister’s involvement in earlier incidents, play a more 
prominent role in ministerial turnover. With de-autonomization we found that the relation 
between the minister and the quango is of greater importance than the relation between the 
parliament and the minister. Future research into this topic may have to employ mixed 
methods to generate results with greater external validity and generalizability when compared 
to the qualitative method that has been used in this study. 
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1   Introduction  
In recent years, four Dutch semi-autonomous government agencies performed 
problematically, either resulting in repositioning of these organizations or in ministers taking 
responsibility by resigning. First, the case of ProRail – a state-owned enterprise that used to 
be part of the Dutch Railway Company and is fully owned and financed by the Dutch 
government – shows that problematic performance can have far-reaching consequences. After 
years of problems on the rail, exceeded budgets, withholding information and the failing high-
speed train Fyra, the designated undersecretary, Wilma Mansveld, resigned in October 2015. 
Roughly a year later, the new undersecretary, Sharon Dijksma, decided to make this railway 
company a ZBO, an independent administrative body that is not hierarchically subordinate to 
a ministry, but is still supervised by the minister (van Thiel and van der Wal, 2010: 383), in 
order to increase control over this organization.1 The government can now approve the budget 
of ProRail, control the quality of their work and make formal rules.  
The Dutch Tax and Customs Administration shows a similar process. A financial 
disaster occurred in 2016, when a leave arrangement called Switch was introduced. Switch 
was a severance scheme, set up for employees who wanted to leave the organization under 
favorable conditions. The goal was to scrap around 5000 administrative, low-skilled jobs until 
2023. However, too many, mainly high-skilled and elder employees made use of Switch. The 
budget was exceeded with 70 million Euros (Wiebes, 2016).2 
After these financial failures the government decided to make the Tax Administration 
part of the Ministry of Finance again, reversing some of the autonomies of this semi-
autonomous organization. The Dutch Tax Administration used to be an independent 
administrative body (in Dutch: ZBO), executing a public task under the responsibility of the 
parent ministry (Trias Politica Zeeland, 2014: 4). This organization now functions as a 
directorate-general of the Ministry of Finance, meaning it is a department of this ministry 
(Borstlap and Joustra, 2017: 30). By the contrary, the undersecretary, Eric Wiebes, 
responsible for Switch, did not resign. 
                                                          
1 Trouw (N.B), ‘Kabinet maakt einde aan zelfstandigheid ProRail,’. Retrieved from: 
https://www.trouw.nl/home/kabinet-maakt-einde-aan-zelfstandigheid-prorail~a1ad171a/ (visited on March 3rd 
2017). 
2 Van Loon, M. (2016), ‘Vertrekregeling van de Belastingdienst is te populair’. Retrieved from: 
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2016/04/16/vertrekregeling-van-de-belastingdienst-is-te-populair-a1407879 (visited 
on March 3rd 2017). 
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Intriguingly, two similar scandals occurred at autonomous government agencies or 
quangos3 , but these did not result in changes in the organizational relation between the 
ministry and the quango. The third scandal, in which an executive agency performed badly, 
happened in October 2005. A fire that broke out in a detention center in the Dutch place 
Schiphol-Oost, the so-called Schiphol-fire (in Dutch: Schipholbrand), killed eleven detained 
illegal immigrants. One immigrant had thrown a burning cigarette in the trashcan in his cell 
and authorities assumed that this caused the fire (Dutch Safety Board, 2006).  
Research on the incident, however, stated that this fire would not have killed and 
injured anyone if the organizations that were responsible for the detention center, the 
Custodial Institutions Agency (in Dutch: Dienst Justitiële Inrichtingen, DJI) and the 
Government Buildings Agency (in Dutch: Rijksgebouwendienst) would have complied with 
the rules of fire safety. After a critical report was published by the Dutch Safety Board in 
2006, the ministers that were politically responsible – minister Donner (Ministry of Security 
and Justice) and minister Dekker (former Ministry of Housing) – resigned.4 In this case, 
however, there were no further organizational consequences for the DJI and the Government 
Buildings Agency.  
The fourth and final scandal discussed here, is that of the personal care budgets (pgb) 
provided by the Social Security Bank (in Dutch: Sociale Verzekeringsbank, SVB). SVB 
provides budgets for personal care to people which allows them to choose their own caretaker. 
After a new payment system was introduced in which SVB was assigned to pay out the 
budgets, the problems began; people did not receive their budgets and if they did, they were 
long overdue.5 There were multiple political debates about this issue, but SVB is still the 
organization responsible for carrying out this task, while maintaining its original structure.6 
The designated undersecretary, van Rijn, did not resign. 
  The four examples illustrate how performance deficiencies can result in organizational 
reforms or ministerial turnover, and how these consequences can vary per case. In some cases, 
far-reaching consequences are employed by the parent ministry and parliament to address 
                                                          
3 A quango is an organization that executes a public task on behalf of a ministry. The theoretical framework 
gives a more elaborated definition of this concept. 
4 De Volkskrant (2006), ‘Donner en Dekker treden af na rapport’. Retrieved from: 
http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/donner-en-dekker-treden-af-na-rapport~a812575/  (visited on March 12th 
2017). 
5 Nu (2015), ‘Druk van Rijn neemt toe na pgb-chaos’. Retrieved from: http://www.nu.nl/politiek/4039694/druk-
van-rijn-neemt-toe-pgb-chaos.html (visited on March 12th 2017). 
6 For an overview of political debates about the pgb-chaos, see: VNG (N.N.), ‘Tweede Kamerdebatten over pgb-
problemen’, Retrieved from:  https://vng.nl/onderwerpenindex/sociaal-domein/persoonsgebonden-budget-
pgb/tweede-kamerdebatten-over-pgb-problemen (visited on March 29th 2017). 
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incidents or problematic performance, while in other cases no such mechanisms and reforms 
are introduced. The Tax Administration and ProRail now both have a different legal status; 
closer to their parent ministry and with less autonomies than before, while the organizations 
involved in the pgb-debacle and the Schiphol-fire were not reduced in their autonomies.  
 Similarly, in not all cases did the minister or undersecretary resign after the quango 
they were responsible for performed badly. Ministerial turnover occurred in the case of the 
Schiphol-fire, as well as in the case of ProRail. In the Tax Administration and the pgb-
debacle, the designated undersecretaries, responsible for the projects that turned out to be 
disastrous, did not resign. 
In all the cases the parliament had concerns which were voiced, but they did not 
undertake a significant amount of action in all cases. There are political debates, in which the 
responsible minister is questioned and in some cases even resigned, but there are no far-
reaching consequences for the unsuccessful government agencies, with regard to their legal 
status. Table 1 gives a schematic overview of the characteristics of the four cases.  
 
Overview of cases                                                                                                            Table 1 
Ministerial turnover 
yes                                                   no  
Reduction 
of 
autonomies 
of quango 
yes    ProRail       Tax Administration 
 
no     Schiphol-fire (DJI and  
         the   Government Buildings  
         Agency) 
      Pgb-debacle (SVB) 
 
 
1.1   Research aims and research question 
The cases present us an intriguing research puzzle. To solve this puzzle, the aim of this 
research is to explain the difference in the actions of the parliament and parent ministries, 
with regard to the steering of quangos. Clearly, communication and control mechanisms may 
increase, in some cases even take a different form, when the level of trust between parliament 
and the responsible minister declines after problematic performance of a quango. The most 
far-reaching consequence after such a decline, is placing the quango closer to the parent 
ministry by changing its legal status, which we refer to as de-autonomization. The most far-
reaching consequence for the responsible minister or undersecretary, is a resignation. Because 
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the cases show that this does not always happen, it is relevant to look into the motives to 
increase control over quangos and the ones politically responsible in such significant ways. 
This research puzzle gives rise to various interesting research questions: What is the 
relation between the parliament and the responsible minister(s) and what part does this play in 
the de-autonomization of quangos and the resignation of ministers? How can political 
dynamics lead to ministerial resignation and explain de-autonomization of quangos? How do 
parliament and the minister interact and in what ways does this influence increased control 
over the quango? Specifically, our study if guided by the following research question: How 
can dynamics in the relationship between parliament and parent ministries because of an 
incident with a quango, explain far-reaching consequences for the responsible minister and 
the quango after that incident? 
 This research adds value to the literature on agentification and  political-administrative 
relations, because it explores changing interactions as a result of a worsening of the relation 
between ministries and agencies, by looking at the role of the parliament. It is clear that a 
change in trust occurs when a quango performs badly, and that this, in turn may lead to a 
change in a variety of organizational aspects such as budgets, rules, processes or even the 
legal status of the organization (Oomsels and Bouckaert, 2014: 4).  
However, current research does not tell us what the role of the parliament exactly is 
when it is decided to make such far-reaching political and organizational changes. This 
research aims to explain this by conducting an in-depth comparative study about the political-
administrative relationships between the parliament and parent ministry and its influence on 
the steering of quangos.  
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2      Theoretical framework  
After providing an introduction to quangos and principal-agent relationships, this section 
explores the relationship between parliament and parent ministries, by presenting literature 
about ministerial turnover and de-autonomization of quangos as a result of damaged trust 
between politics and administration and the role of certain ministerial characteristics in this 
matter.  
2.1   Quangos: semi-autonomous government organizations 
Literature about ideal typical, formal political-administrative relations states that politicians 
make plans that are executed by the administration. Both fields execute their task 
independently of each other (Schedler and Eichen, 2013: 371). The administration has a high 
degree of discretion in the technical implementation of political goals (Lipsky, 1980; Svara, 
2001: 176-177; Schedler and Eichen, 2013: 371). The relation between elected officials and 
the administration is therefore assumed to be an interplay between professional independence 
and political control (Svara, 2001: 179), resulting in different kinds of political-administrative 
relations. 
One example of such a relationship, that plays a central role in this research, are 
quangos; organizations that operate at arms’ length of the government. These organizations 
have a large professional independence when it comes to performing public tasks, while being 
dependent on the government for financial resources (van Thiel and van der Wal, 2010: 378; 
Pollit et al., 2001: 274 and 275). In order to find a balance between performing public tasks 
and independece, there needs to be a certain amount of political control (Schedler and Eichen, 
2013: 376). 
Based on the work of Talbot (2004), Overman and van Thiel (2016: 612) state that 
quangos (semi-autonomous organizations) are structurally disaggregated from a ministry that 
carry out public tasks and have more business-like work approaches than traditional 
government organizations. Regardless of these similarities, there are different types of 
quangos. Overman and van Thiel (2016: 613) distinguish three main types of semi-
autonomous organizations. Type 1 is “a semi-autonomous unit within the government, 
without legal independence”. The type 1 quango is therefore hierarchically subordinate to a 
ministry and closest to the government (e.g. an agency). With this type there is full ministerial 
accountability about policies and its implementation by the quango (Algemene Rekenkamer, 
2012: 1).  
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Type 2 is a statutory body with legal independence, meaning that the organization is 
not hierarchically subordinate to a ministry and has extended autonomies, while still being 
under the responsibility of the ministry (e.g. Dutch ZBOs). The ministerial accountability is 
limited to the policy and its regulations (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2012: 2). With a ZBO a 
ministry can appoint and dismiss directors, determine the salary of these directors and reverse 
bad decisions made by the ZBO.7  
Type 3 quango is “a private law-based organization, such as state-owned companies” 
(Overman and van Thiel, 2016: 613). This type has the highest degree of autonomy. Here, the 
ministerial accountability limits itself to regulating the market shares (Algemene Rekenkamer, 
2012: 2). Table 2 shows how the influence of the responsible ministry declines with each type 
of quango. 
 
Semi-autonomous government organizations                                                                Table 2 
Type 1 (e.g. Agency) Full ministerial 
accountability, hierarchically 
subordinate to ministry. 
Accountability about policies 
and policy implementation. 
Type 2 (e.g. ZBO) Limited ministerial 
accountability, not 
hierarchically subordinate; 
legal independence. 
Accountability about policy 
regulations. 
Type 3 (e.g. state-owned 
enterprise) 
Private law-based 
organization. 
Accountability about 
regulating market-shares.  
 
2.2   Principal and agent relations 
Even though agentification – as a result of the rise of New Public Management – is a new way 
of confronting problems (Hood, 1991), literature about parent ministries and quangos 
emphasizes that a variety of new challenges emerged with these autonomous organizational 
arrangements that became popular in the eighties and nineties. As stated above, quangos are 
given more autonomy than other government organizations, so they can decide themselves 
how to carry out their public task (van Thiel and Yesilkagit, 2011: 784). Because quangos 
have greater autonomy, the parliament and parent ministries, as the principals, face more 
                                                          
7 Rijksoverheid (N.N.), ‘Zelfstandige Bestuursorganen (zbo’s)’. Retrieved from: 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/rijksoverheid/inhoud/zelfstandige-bestuursorganen (visited on March 
29th 2017). 
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uncertainties with regard to these semi-autonomous organizations. The principal-agent 
problem therefore plays a prominent role in this relationship (van Thiel and Yesilkagit, 2011; 
van Thiel and van der Wal, 2010: 8). The core of the principal-agent problem is the risk of 
bureaucratic drift. Because the autonomous agencies have more discretionary authority, 
controlling and monitoring becomes harder for the principal(s). 
Van Thiel and Yesilkagit (2011: 784), furthermore, describe multi-layered principal-
agent relationships that have expanded with the rise of quangos. They add another layer to the 
traditional principal-agent relations that have been described by Strøm (1985). Primarily, 
there is a principal-agent relationship between voters (principal) and politicians (agent) that 
are elected by the voters and act on behalf of them. Bureaucrats (agents) then carry out 
decisions that are made by politicians (principal). The last layer van Thiel and Yesilkagit 
(2011) added, is the delegation of tasks from the bureaucrats (principal) to quangos (agent). 
This means that the ministry has to account for the quango to the parliament (van Thiel and 
Yesilkagit, 2011: 789).  
The multi-layered relationship shows that there is no direct communication between 
the parliament and the quango; the ministry is dominant in this relation (van Thiel and van der 
Wal, 2010: 380-381). The relation between the ministry and the quango is therefore the most 
important for the quango. However, the role of the parliament is still of great importance. The 
parliament acts on behalf of citizens, so in order to remain legitimate (Laver and Shepsle, 
1994: 7) the parliament strives to exert its influence over the minister and therefore indirectly 
steers the quango. The importance of the parliament in this matter is discussed in the 
following chapter (see: chapter 2.3) 
Because quangos are the professionals that carry responsibility for the technical 
implementation of policies, asymmetrical information may become a problem. The ministry  
has an advantage over the parliament when it comes to knowledge; the minister is obliged to 
inform the parliament about its policies. The advantage, however, enables the agent to act 
opportunistically and take actions that could harm the principal, for instance by withholding 
information (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 270). This threat causes uncertainties between the 
parliament and the ministries to rise.  
2.3   Ministerial turnover: Role of the parliament and ministerial 
characteristics 
A principal-agent relation becomes especially problematic when the uncertainties due to 
potential opportunistic behavior lead to considerations about the resignation of a minister. 
 8 
Annie Svanishvili  To give up or to step up?  Leiden University 
Literature about this topic has no definite answer to when ministers resign. There are, 
however, a few circumstances in which resignation might occur, according to Tompson and 
Tillotsen (1999: 49).  
 A minister might resign when she acts in her public capacity without her department 
backing her up. In this case, personal errors might be made, such as private indiscretion or 
political misjudgment. This indicates that faults or scandals from a minister’s personal life, 
such as fraud or infidelity, might lead to the resignation of that particular minister.  
 Policy errors are another circumstance mentioned by Tompson and Tillotsen (1999: 
49).  In this case, the errors can be directly linked to the minister. This goes particularly for 
withholding information. The authors argue that a minister will be likely to resign when it 
comes out that she has been withholding information from the parliament, or deliberately 
misinformed the parliament. 
It is particularly interesting that literature about the resignation of ministers (Tompson 
and Tillotsen, 1999: 49; Berlinksi, Dewan and Dowding, 2010; Fisher, 2012: 603), states that 
politics play a central role in the resignation of a minister, while ministerial characteristics 
could also contribute. The minister is held accountable by the parliament for her mistakes, 
confirming our earlier statements about the significant amount of influence that the parliament 
has on the actions of ministers. A minister’s moral obligation to resign does not automatically 
lead to a resignation. This leads us to believe that a combination of political influence and 
ministerial characteristics can explain ministerial turnover.  
Tompson and Tillotsen (1999: 49) offer that the parliament will consider two 
strategies in determining the resignation of a minister. They can decide that the minister 
should tough-it-out. With this strategy, the parliament gives the minister the benefit of the 
doubt in order to solve the issues. In this case, the parliament protects the minister from 
resignation (Dewan and Myatt, 2007). The other strategy is to consider the amount of damage 
a minister does to the government. When the parliament decides that the minister seriously 
harms the government and letting the minister go would benefit the government, she can 
decide to go for the damage-limitation strategy. In some cases, the parliament first lets a 
minister tough-it-out before employing the damage-limitation strategy and pressuring a  
minister to resign.  
Closely related to this, are the number of scandals that a minister has been involved 
with during the government term (Dewan and Myatt, 2007: 64). This is supported by the 
principal of tainted and clean ministers. Dewan and Myatt (2007: 64) state that a tainted 
minister is known for his involvement in one or more scandals. A tainted minister is, 
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therefore, more likely to be pressured to resign when another scandal occurs, making the 
parliament decide to use the damage-limitation strategy. A clean minister, however, has more 
chance of surviving a scandal, because she has a scandal-free record. In this case, the 
parliament might decide to give the minister another shot and protect her from resignation, 
employing the tough-it-out strategy.  
To conclude this matter, literature states that ministers are more likely to resign either 
in a reshuffle, or when the government falls, which is plausible given the principal of tainted 
and clean ministers (Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding, 2007: 248). The longer a minister is 
assigned, the more time there is for scandals to occur and come out. So ministers are more 
likely to resign when the end of the government term is nearby. In conclusion, the timing of a 
scandal can influence the number of scandals a minister is involved with and therefore plays a 
role in ministerial turnover. We formulate the following hypothesis to explore the matter of 
tainted ministers: 
 H1: A minister will be more likely to resign after bad performance of the quango she 
oversees, if she is tainted.  
So here, a tainted minister would lead to the parliament employing the damage-limitation 
strategy. This hypothesis further implies that the resignation of the tainted minister will be 
near the end of the government term, because then the chances of a minister having been 
involved in a scandal, are higher. 
2.4   The influence of trust on behavior  
The principal-agent relations and the uncertainties that can come with it, emphasize the 
importance of a trusting relation between the parliament and the responsible ministry. We 
already established that the parliament can have an important role in the steering of quangos, 
through the responsible minister. Therefore, trust between the parliament and the minister is 
relevant. In this respect, it is important to note that we view ‘trust’ as actions that are related 
to behaviors of the parties that are involved (van de Walle and Six, 2014: 168). Seeing trust as 
behavior indicates that the relation is based on observable risk-taking behavior, in which the 
actor is willing to take a risk and be vulnerable (Oomsels and Bouckaert, 2014: 9).  
Another issue that should be addressed, is that this research treats trust and distrust as 
two different concepts, rather than two sides of the same coin (van de Walle and Six, 2014: 
162; Oomsels and Bouckaert, 2014: 14). Some literature about trust argues that trust does not 
equal an absence of distrust and distrust does not equal a total absence of trust. An individual 
can trust another person (willing to take risks and be vulnerable), while still being unsure 
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about the purity of that person’s intentions. This example illustrates a situation where trust 
simultaneously contains distrust. Further, van de Walle and Six (2014: 168) state that trust 
and distrust are related to behavior. Therefore, we assume that trust and distrust have a 
different impact on the interactions – behavior – between the parliament and the parent 
ministry.  
A variety of authors emphasizes the role of trust in inter-organizational relationships 
and its effects on interactions between organizational actors (Bachmann, 2001; Dirks and 
Ferrin, 2001; Gulati and Nickerson, 2008; van Thiel and Yesilkagit, 2011; Bouckaert, 2012; 
Oomsels and Bouckaert, 2014; Bachmann, Gillespie and Priem, 2015). Dirks and Ferrin 
(2001) find it unclear how the benefits of trust exactly occur. Some scholars (Gulati and 
Nickerson, 2008: 690; Bachmann and Witteloostuijn, 2009: 54) state that trust increases 
confidence in the behavior of the other actor, and that this positive expectation reduces 
uncertainties between them. Therefore, trust is especially important in principal-agent 
relationship that are characterized by high levels of uncertainty.  
Considering that trust is an uncertainty-reducing mechanism, trust in the relationship 
between the principal and the agent will improve their interactions (van Thiel and van der 
Wal, 2010: 381). Krouwel and Abts (2007: 258) say the following about trusting relations: 
“Confidence, despite its conditionality, frees individuals from the need of constant monitoring 
and thus can ultimately take the form of a naive and unquestioned leap of faith”. Trust-
literature therefore argues that high levels of trust are characterized by low monitoring, and 
infrequent interactions between parliament, parent ministry and quango. Based on a leap of 
faith, certain routines have been established and opportunistic behavior is less likely to occur 
because it is not beneficial (van der Walle and Six, 2014: 159).  
2.5   Low levels of trust 
Literature about trust, according to van Thiel and Yesilkagit (2011: 788), states that it is easier 
to break trust than to create it, but when treating trust and distrust as distinctive matters, the 
inability to trust the intentions of the other party does not automatically mean that there is 
distrust between them. It rather means that a low levels of trust exists between the two parties 
(van de Walle and Six, 2014: 159). Even though the statement that ‘breaking trust is easy’ is 
not elaborated on, it might imply that breaking trust equals a total lack of trust. When making 
a distinction between trust, low levels of trust and distrust, like authors as van de Walle and 
Six (2014: 169) do, breaking trust is treated as a nuanced matter. Considering that low levels 
of trust exist, a good and trusting relation does not instantly lead to distrust when the other 
 11 
Annie Svanishvili  To give up or to step up?  Leiden University 
party does not act according to the expectations. We rather assume that the level of trust might 
drop and result in low levels of trust, after which an unsuccessful restoration of trust does lead 
to distrust. 
Low levels of trust influence perceptions, but are less likely to influence behaviors. 
With low levels of trust even well-intended actions are either perceived as negative, not 
perceived at all, or perceived as harmful. We specifically point out that trust is still at the basis 
of low levels of trust  (van de Walle and Six, 2014: 169). A loss of trust will therefore lead to 
negative attitudes from the principal towards the agent (i.e. skepticism), but not necessarily to 
increased interactions between the parliament and the parent ministry in the form of reduced 
autonomies or the resignation of the minister that is responsible.  
We can make a link between these negative attitudes from the parliament towards the 
minister and the tough-it-out strategy that has been elaborated on earlier in this theoretical 
framework. In the case of low levels of trust, the quango has shown faulty behavior for which 
the minister is held accountable. This leads to negative expectations of the parliament with 
regard to further behavior of its agents (the ministry and indirectly the quango), lowering the 
level of trust between them. Instead of undertaking drastic actions, the parliament decides to 
give the minister some time to “tough it out” and fix the faults. In this case, there are no 
significant changes in the behavior of the principal towards the agent. The minister is not 
pressured to resign – apart from the moral obligation that the minister might have – and the 
parliament does not increase control over the quango by reducing autonomies. These steps are 
not taken because there is still trust in the minister; just less than before. The following 
hypotheses examines the link between low levels of trust and its effects on the responsible 
minister (H2) and the quango (H3): 
H2: When bad performance of the quango results in low levels of trust between the 
parliament and the parent ministry, the parliament will not demand ministerial turnover. 
H3: When bad performance of the quango results in low levels of trust between the 
parliament and the parent ministry, the parliament will not demand de-autonomization of the 
quango. 
A minister’s ability to defend his policies8 can be important in this matter; the better a 
minister is in defending his policies during debates, the more likely the parliament will give 
him the benefit of the doubt (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2008: 170). The parliament will 
                                                          
8 We refer to this as ministerial performance – how well does a minister perform during a debate? 
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employ the tough-it-out strategy on this minister, because good ministerial performance 
benefits the restoration of trust. 
H4: If the ministerial performance of a minister during debates is good, the 
parliament will employ the tough-it-out strategy instead of the damage limitation strategy.9  
2.6   Distrust 
Trust literature indicates that distrust, on the other hand, does have a significant effect on the 
behaviors of the actors that are involved. Oomsels and Bouckaert (2014: 11) describe distrust 
as followed: “Active avoidance of risk, inspires atomization, regulation and behavioral 
control, which protect actors against possible abuse of their vulnerability, which is argued to 
lead to foregone opportunities and associated high opportunity costs”. With this definition, 
they imply that distrust leads to active control from one actor over another, which may result 
in less collaboration and a deterioration of relationships (Oomsels and Bouckaert, 2014: 13). 
So, when trust turns into distrust after incidents the interactions between both parties are 
likely to change (van Thiel and Yesilkagit, 2011: 788).  
Van de Walle and Six (2014: 162) state that distrust can be seen as the assured 
assumption that the other party has intended harm for them. As a result of distrust, this 
assumption is likely to increase the interactions between the principal(s) and the quango. 
Therefore, the principals will actively monitor the quango (Krouwel and Abts, 2007: 258). 
The parliament can monitor the ministries (and indirectly the quangos) by using different 
types of control mechanisms, such as demanding political debates, conducting inquiries, 
asking chamber questions and file several motions (e.g. motion of no confidence).10 The 
ministry interacts with the quango by performing audit procedures and by receiving feedback 
about the policy implementation and budgets through reports, off course depending on the 
type of quango. When there is distrust, (additional) formal procedures and regulation will be 
designed to constrain and prevent further untrustworthy behavior, therefore increasing control 
over the quango (Oomsels and Bouckaert, 2014: 11; Bachmann, Gillespie and Priem, 2015: 
1126).  
We can also link distrust to the damage-limitation strategy, a concept that is discussed 
above and implies that the parliament distrusts the minister when it comes to the steering of 
the quango. The parliament assumes that the minister will do more damage to the government 
                                                          
9 The methods section gives an overview of “good” and “bad” ministerial performance (see: operationalization, 
pp. 17 and the coding scheme, pp. 18) 
10 Parlement & Politiek (N.B.), ‘Controle Tweede Kamer’. Retrieved from: 
https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhrpmxvm/controle_tweede_kamer (visited on March 29th 2017). 
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and its quango if he does not resign. Literature about this topic suggests that this assumption 
of the parliament will likely result in the resignation of the minister (see for example: 
Woodhouse, 1993).  
Not only can this strategy be linked to ministerial turnover, but also to de-
autonomization of quangos. Distrust results in changing interactions between the principal 
and the agent. The parliament distrust the minister, after which she is likely to resign and the 
new minister is obliged to effectively control the quango. In order to prevent further damage, 
the  control over the quango may also be stricter, just in case something could go wrong that 
could damage the image of the government and quango even further. In order to ensure the 
new-found trust of the parliament, the minister will be more likely to make far-reaching 
decisions about the position of the quango. Therefore, we formulate the following hypotheses 
about ministerial turnover (H5) and de-autonomization (H6): 
H5: When there is distrust between the parliament and parent ministry, diminishing 
the credibility of the minister’s assurance, the principals are more likely to demand 
ministerial turnover of the designated minister. 
H6:  When there is distrust between the parliament and parent ministry, the principals 
are more likely to demand de-autonomization of the quango. 
So here, distrust results in the parliament using the damage-limitation strategy. The minister 
will be more likely to resign and control over the quango is more likely to increase. Note that 
these far-reaching consequences imply that the minister was unable to re-establish trust, 
which has to do with the ministerial performance (the ability of the minister to defend his 
policies during debates). Finally note that, based on the literature, distrust is the main driver 
for significant political and organizational changes, while ministerial characteristics, like the 
number of scandals the minister has been involved with and his abilities to defend his policies 
may also play a role during the process of trust restoration.  
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3   Conceptual model      
 
   End of government term  
 
              
  Tainted minister  Damage-limitation     
               strategy  
 
             Distrust   De-autonomization 
 
Scandal  Clean minister  Tough-it-out    Ministerial turnover 
           strategy  
 
Low level of                                             Ministerial performance 
        trust                      
Figure 1 
 
In the conceptual model the relationships between a scandal, ministerial characteristics, the 
role of the parliament and trust are visualized. A scandal with a clean minister will lead to a 
lower level of trust than before. The parliament will choose to give the responsible minister 
the benefit of the doubt by using the tough-it-out strategy. The minister is less likely to resign 
in this situation. We assume that de-autonomization of the quango will similarly not occur, 
because the actions of the principal will not (significantly) change in this situation. 
 When a scandal occurs and the responsible minister is already tainted, we expect that 
the parliament will employ the damage-limitation strategy, because the minister might do 
sustained damage to the government. We also expect that a minister is more likely to be 
tainted at the end of the government term. This increases the likelihood of ministerial 
turnover. Further, we believe that de-autonomization is more likely to follow after the 
resignation of the responsible minister, in order to limit the chances on incidents and bad 
performance in the future. 
Even low levels of trust might eventually result in ministerial turnover and de-
autonomization of quangos. When a minister is given the benefit of the doubt after a scandal, 
and he fails to restore the trust of the parliament, either by successfully defending his policy 
during debates or improving the performance of the quango, the parliament is likely to decide 
that the minister does more bad than good to the government. Low levels of trust and the 
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tough-it-out strategy then make place for distrust and the damage-limitation strategy. Distrust 
changes the behavior of one actor towards the other, in this case from the principal towards 
the responsible minister.  
We expect that the parliament will employ the damage-limitation strategy when a 
minister cannot effectively defend his policy and is therefore unable to restore the trust of the 
parliament. Through this process chain, low levels of trust might lead to de-autonomization 
and ministerial turnover. When it becomes clear that the minister had been unable to steer the 
quango correctly, then the parliament might consider that it is better to not place the quango 
too far away from the ministry in the future.   
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4   Methodology  
This research employs a deductive, qualitative research method, in order to perform a 
comparative small-N case study (see: case selection). Through the cases we qualitatively 
explore the relation between the independent and dependent variables. There are two 
dependent variables in this research. The first is de-autonomization – the reversion of 
autonomies or repositioning – of quangos after problematic performance of the quango. The 
second dependent variable is ministerial turnover11 after bad performance of the quango the 
minister oversees.  
The independent variables that might explain variation in de-autonomization of 
quangos and ministerial turnover, focus on ministerial characteristics and dynamics between 
parliament and ministries. More specifically, the ministerial characteristics, as independent 
variables, are “tainted” or “clean” ministers and ministerial performance before and during 
debates. The dynamics between parliament and minister are the usage of the tough-it-out 
strategy, the damage limitation strategy, low levels of trust and distrust between the 
parliament and minister. These independent variables may influence whether or not de-
autonomization takes place after problematic performance of quangos and whether or not a 
minister resigns after bad performance of the quango; two far-reaching consequences of 
poorly functioning quangos.  
4.1   Data collection  
The research employs a document-analysis by relying on qualitative primary and secondary 
resources, where primary sources are produced at the time of the (historical) event, while 
secondary sources are documents that are written with the use of primary sources (Lombard, 
2010: 150; Scheuler, 2014: 163). Government documents are the basis of this analysis, 
because the research emphasizes the relation between the Dutch parliament and ministers. 
Therefore, primary sources are (important) debates and reports of parliamentary inquiries. 
Other primary sources are chamber questions and letters between the minister and parliament. 
Secondary sources are newspaper articles that report on the same issue in a more general way, 
providing insight in the course of action during the incidents.  
Due to possible time constraints, we do not conduct interviews or surveys. We believe 
that we can get insight in the relationship between minister and parliament by analyzing 
political debates, especially because we perceive trust to be behavioral (van de Walle and Six, 
                                                          
11 This can be either a minister of undersecretary. It depends on the person that is responsible for the quango. 
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2014: 168; Oomsels and Bouckaert, 2014: 9), and therefore observable by looking at 
behaviors between actors.  
4.2   Case selection 
In this research, four seemingly similar cases are analyzed. By taking a closer look, it comes 
forward that everything is different, from the circumstances to the outcomes (see: Table 1, pp. 
3).  Therefore, a qualitative comparative analysis approach is employed. The necessary and 
sufficient conditions of ministerial turnover and de-autonomization of quangos are of great 
importance when evaluating our hypotheses (Toshkov, 2016: 270).  
 To elaborate on the case selection, two cases show de-autonomization of quangos 
while the other two cases do not show such a process. The cases that show de-autonomization 
are the Dutch Tax Administration – a former ZBO that is now a directorate-general of the 
Ministry of Finance – and ProRail, a ZBO that used to be a privatized state-owned company, 
but has is autonomies reversed after bad performance. The cases that have not shown de-
autonomization are the Schiphol-fire, that killed eleven people, and the pgb-chaos, that 
resulted in unpaid salaries for months. Ministerial turnover occurred in two cases, namely in 
the case of ProRail and the Schiphol-fire. In the case of the Tax Administration and the pgb-
debacle, the responsible ministers did not resign. In all the cases the quangos have performed 
badly and the consequences for society have been significant.  
4.3   Reliability and validity  
Document analyses do not ensure consistent results, because such analyses are influenced by 
the interpretation of the researcher. Another researcher may interpret the same documents 
differently when replicating the study. Focusing on primary government documents could 
also influence reliability. On the one hand, these documents are reliable in themselves, 
because they have been produced at the time of the event or shortly after; the documents do 
not change. On the other hand, the documents are written in a certain context that should be 
taken into account when conducting a document analysis (Scheuler, 2014: 164).  
In order to enhance the reliability of this research, a coding scheme is put in place to 
conduct a thematic analysis (Bryman, 2012: 13). The coding scheme should enhance the 
reliability of the document analysis, because it structures the analysis by using codes 
(Bryman, 2012: 13). The elements that should be focused on are presented. This enhances the 
consistency of the analysis and the results. 
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Determining the right indicators for in the coding scheme enhances the internal 
validity of the research. However, not all variables that could be related to the relationship 
between parliament, parent ministry and quango (e.g. informal communication) are included 
in the research, due to time constraints. To proceed, the external validity is not high in small-
N case studies, because the research only focuses on a couple of cases (Bryman, 2012: 69). 
Therefore, the results can typically only be applied to the selected cases and statements about 
the findings should be modest.  
4.4   Operationalization  
Hypothesis 1 covers the principal of ministerial turnover of tainted ministers. In order to 
measure if a minister is tainted, we look into the number of previous scandals a minister has 
been involved in, with the help of newspaper articles. These give information about such 
scandals. In reports about debates, we focus on references to these scandals, in order to 
determine if former incidents are an issue for the parliament. We focus on the time that a 
scandal has come out until the ministerial turnover.  
Hypotheses 2 and 3 examine the link between low levels of trust, the tough-it-out 
strategy and far-reaching consequences for minister and quango. We analyze this matter by 
examining the type of control mechanisms that the parliament utilizes and the tone of the 
members of the parliament (both mild to skeptical) during the deciding debates – debates that 
are considered tough by the media and determinative for the future of the minister and 
quango. The time frame that we focus on here is the moment that the parliament became 
aware of the problematic performance or scandal until the problems were solved, in this case 
by the minister and the quango themselves.  
We expect to see that the parliament made use of chamber questions and motions of 
sadness, which is the lightest motion of the parliament (in Dutch: Motie van Treurnis). 
Newspaper articles, as well as reports of parliamentary meetings, debates and Second 
Chamber questions give insight in these concepts.  
The fourth hypothesis covers ministerial performance. If a minister is good at 
defending her policy, answering questions and taking responsibility, the parliament will be 
more likely to give the minister the benefit of the doubt. We examine this by the following 
issues: a minister either answers questions or avoids them and a minister either takes 
responsibility or denies responsibility by blaming others.  
The fifth and sixth hypotheses examine the link between distrust, de-autonomization 
and ministerial turnover. To measure this, the emphasis lies on the use of severe control 
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mechanisms (motion of disapproval, motion of no-confidence, parliamentary inquiry) from 
the parliament over the responsible minister and a tone of (extreme) disappointment and 
mistrust. In this case, the time frame is the moment that the parliament became aware of the 
problematic performance or scandal, until the far-reaching consequences took place.  
The use of these severe control mechanisms are examined by analyzing newspaper articles 
and government documents: reports of deciding debates, Chamber letters and questions. 
Second Chamber letters give a good overview of the issues that the parliament has with a 
minister. The number of chamber questions gives insight in the restoration of trust; the more 
questions the parliament asks, the less it is satisfied with the answers the minister gives.  
Table 3 gives insight on the indicators that should be focused on when carrying out the 
document analysis. We use NVivo 11 to conduct the document analysis of the deciding 
debates. This program shows the percentage coverage of the codes in the coded reports of the 
deciding debates. 
 
Document Analysis – Coding Scheme                                                                             Table 3 
Concept  Definition Code Indicators 
Tainted minister A minister that has been 
involved in a scandal 
during his time as a 
minister which the public 
knows of (Dewan and 
Myatt, 2007: 64). 
Previous 
scandals 
Has been involved in 
(a) scandal(s) 
before; parliament 
referring to previous 
missteps during 
debates. 
Clean minister 
 
A minister that has not 
been involved in scandals 
during his time as a 
minister (Dewan and 
Myatt, 2007: 64). 
Clean record  Has not been 
involved in other 
scandals. 
Ministerial 
performance   
The ability (or success) of a 
minister to defend his 
policy during a debate with 
the parliament.  
1. Good 
ministerial 
performance 
 
2. Bad 
ministerial 
1. Minister takes 
responsibility for 
incident or problems; 
minister 
acknowledges errors; 
minister prepared for 
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performance debate; minister 
provided relevant 
information; minister 
answers questions. 
2. Minister blames 
others; minister 
denies errors; 
minister avoids 
questions; minister is 
reluctant to share 
information. 
Low level of trust –  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tough-it-out 
strategy 
A loss of trust that has no 
significant effects on 
actions in an exchange 
relationship, but does lead 
to negative attitudes from 
one actor towards the other 
(van de Walle and Six, 
2014). In this case the 
parliament employs the 
tough-it-out strategy 
because she believes that 
the minister can 
successfully restore trust 
after a scandal, allowing 
the minister to stay 
(Tompson and Tillotsen, 
1999: 49). Similarly, the 
organizational structure of 
the quango will not change. 
Mild control 
mechanisms 
parliament 
Chamber questions; 
letters of 
government; motion 
of sadness; mild 
expressions of 
disappointment; 
parliament still has 
hope; “How can we 
fix this?”; “We want 
an explanation”; 
“The minister should 
fix the problems”; 
“We are curious how 
the minister will 
solve this”; “The 
minister is competent 
enough to steer the 
quango”.  
Distrust –  
 
 
A severe loss of trust that 
results in the assured belief 
that the other party does 
Severe control 
mechanisms 
parliament 
Parliamentary 
inquiry held; Motion 
of disapproval; 
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Damage limitation 
strategy 
intended harm (van der 
Walle and Six, 2014: 162).  
Significant changes in  
interactions between two 
actors, result in damage 
control by increased 
monitoring behavior 
(Krouwel and Abts, 2007: 
258). The parliament 
employs the damage 
limitation strategy because 
she believes that the 
minister does sustained 
damage to the government 
after a scandal (Tompson 
and Tillotsen, 1999: 49), 
pressuring the minister to 
resign and inclined to 
structurally reform the 
quango. 
Motion of no 
confidence; 
parliament does not 
accept answers of 
minister; strong 
expressions of 
disappointment; no 
restoration of 
trust;”This should 
not have happened”; 
“The minister has 
proven that he/she 
cannot be trusted”; 
”You lost our trust”; 
“We cannot move on 
from this”; ”He 
cannot get away with 
this”. 
 
In the following section (chapter 5), we give a chronological overview of the four cases, after 
which we shortly present the results of the analysis of each case. Then, we move on to the 
comparative analysis (chapter 6) that shows the differences and similarities between the cases. 
 
 
 
 22 
Annie Svanishvili  To give up or to step up?  Leiden University 
5   Cases 
5.1   Chronological overview  
5.1.1   ProRail 
ProRail is a Dutch railway company that is responsible for the maintenance of the railways. 
ProRail used to be a part of the Dutch National Railways NS (in Dutch: Nationale 
Spoorwegen), but in the 90s the two companies were separated to enable competition on the 
railways.12 ProRail was privatized in 2005 and operated as a state owned company, in order to 
increase efficiency and performance.13  
However, the privatization was reversed in 2016 after some incidents occurred. The 
organization struggled with the execution of their main task, which is maintaining the 
railways. These problems often resulted in delays and accidents, especially during the winter. 
Several other incidents, for instance ICT errors and derailed trains, have occurred throughout 
the years.14  
Another issue of ProRail was that they had exceeded their budget multiple times with 
millions of Euros. A variety of projects of ProRail showed that the organization had little 
financial control. For instance, the new railway between Schiphol and Lelystad cost 260 
million Euros more than anticipated and the renewal of the platforms of several cities 
similarly led to deficits of millions of Euros.15  
Besides the problematic performance and the deficits of ProRail, the organization has 
had trouble sharing information with the parliament, and with the designated undersecretary, 
Mrs. Wilma Mansveld 16 In 2013, a Dutch newspaper revealed that the Ministry of 
Infrastructure had an important internal report of ProRail in possession, which was never 
shared with Mansveld, nor with the parliament.  
At the same time, in 2013, the so-called Fyra-debacle reached its boiling point. A fast 
connection between Amsterdam and Brussels, which was occupied by new trains of the 
company Fyra, had a lot of problems and cost about 200 million Euros.17 In 2013, the cabinet 
decided to stop working with Fyra because of the problems and the high costs. The parliament 
                                                          
12 NS (N.B), ‘Verantwoordelijkheden’. Retrieved from: http://www.ns.nl/over-ns/de-
spoorsector/verantwoordelijkheden.html (visited on May 22nd 2017). 
13 Kamerstukken I, 2012-2013, Parlementair Onderzoek Privatisering/Verzelfstandiging Overheidsdiensten. 
14 NOS (2016), ‘Bevroren wissels en veel te dure stations: ProRail had veel problemen’. Retrieved from: 
http://nos.nl/artikel/2138123-bevroren-wissels-en-veel-te-dure-stations-prorail-had-veel-problemen.html  (visited 
on April 16th 2017). 
15 Idem. 
16 Zuidervaart, B. (2013), ‘Mansveld hield problemen bij spoor achter’. Retrieved from: 
https://www.trouw.nl/home/mansveld-hield-problemen-bij-spoor-achter~abcd4554/ (visited on April 16th 2017). 
17 NU (2013), ‘Kabinet stopt definitief met Fyra’. Retrieved from: http://www.nu.nl/politiek/3494820/kabinet-
stopt-definitief-met-fyra.html (visited on April 17th 2017). 
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started a parliamentary inquiry, which was presented two years later on October 28th 2015. 
The report ‘The Traveler in the Cold’ critiqued the role of undersecretary Mansveld in the 
Fyra debacle.  
Also in 2015, the relationship between ProRail and Wilma Mansveld appeared to be 
problematic. This became clear when on September 9th in 2015, the new president director of 
ProRail, Pier Eringa, came forward by stating that ProRail was instructed by the Ministry of 
Infrastructure to delay bad news. Mansveld stated that Eringa took his words back (Mansveld, 
September 9th 2015).  
After Mansveld informed the parliament about a possible deficit of 475 million Euros, 
a debate took place on September 29th 2015, in which a motion of no-confidence was filed. 18  
During the debate the legitimate use of financial sources was central. In the end, the debate 
was cut short, because the parliament wanted more information and asked Mansveld to 
answer the remaining questions by letter and to send documents about recent stakeholder 
meetings and letters from the accountant of ProRail.19 The parliament also pleated for an 
external investigation. The undersecretary agreed and said she was determined to step up 
(Mansveld, October 15th 2015). 
However, during that time, the report ‘The Traveler in the Cold’ about the Fyra-
debacle of 2013, was presented. 20  The report that was published on October 28th 2015, 
concluded that the parliament was not, or incorrectly informed several times. Mansveld took 
responsibility for the Fyra-debacle and decided to resign. Roughly a year later, the new 
undersecretary Dijksma, decided to increase control over ProRail by transitioning its status 
from a state-owned company to a ZBO, on December 9th 2016. Transitioning the privatized 
organization closer to the public sector would allow the undersecretary to take direct 
responsibility for ProRail.21  
5.1.2   Dutch Tax Administration 
The Dutch Tax Administration is a government organization that functions at arm’s length of 
the Ministry of Finance, while levying taxes, detecting and prosecuting tax fraud and paying 
                                                          
18 Handelingen II, 2015-2016, nr. 7, item 32, pp. 45. Debat over ProRail. 
19 Handelingen II, 2015-2016, nr. 7, item 32, pp. 44. 
20  Kamerstukken II, 2015-2016, 33 678, nr. 11, Reizigers in the Kou. Retrieved from: 
http://www.parlement.com/9291000/d/pdfs/rapport_dereizigerindekou.pdf  
21  Rijksoverheid (2016), ‘ProRail definitief publiek’. Retrieved from: 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2016/12/09/prorail-definitief-publiek (visited on April 18th 2017). 
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out allowances.22 Because the world is changing the Tax Administration wanted to modernize 
communication and improve its ICT systems.23 Therefore, this organization is implementing a 
large-scale reorganization since 2015: the Investment Agenda (in Dutch: Investeringsagenda).  
In order to reach the goals, the idea was for the Tax Administration to scrap 5000 low-
skilled administrative jobs, because these jobs would no longer fit the new, modern Tax 
Administration. In order to modernize the organization 1500 high-skilled employees would be 
hired to work with the new ICT systems.24 In order to achieve this, a temporary severance 
scheme called Switch was introduced in January 2016 as part of the Investment Agenda.25  
However, this idea did not work out like anticipated. In September 2016 already 7280 
people had shown interest to apply for Switch (Wiebes, September 14th 2016), wanting to 
leave the organization. In the end, between 4900 and 5100, especially high-skilled employees 
could make use of this severance scheme, while the goal was to scrap low-skilled  jobs 
(Wiebes, September 14th 2016). Also, older employees from over the 60 left the organization 
under favorable conditions, in which Switch operated as an early exit settlement (RUV-
settlement, in Dutch: Regeling voor Vervroegde Uittreding). Because of the popularity of 
Switch, the scheme cost 66 million Euros more than anticipated. In July 2016, a proposal was 
filed to stop applications for Switch.26  
In order to ensure that future arrangements would not be established in this 
problematic way, Wiebes informed the parliament in a letter (Wiebes, October 24th 2016) that 
he was taking a few measures. He appointed a commission of Elder Men, that is evaluating 
the decision-making processes of the Tax Administration. The financial decision-making of 
the Tax Administration was further put under legal restraint on October 12th 2016. The Tax 
Administration is now placed under the Ministry of Finance, and the management of the Tax 
Administration functions according to the DG-model instead of a model with a Board of 
Directors.  
                                                          
22  Rijksoverheid (N.N), ‘Wat zijn de taken en bevoegdheden van de Belastingdienst?’. Retrieved from: 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/inkomstenbelasting/vraag-en-antwoord/wat-zijn-de-taken-en-
bevoegdheden-van-de-belastingdienst (visited on April 13th 2017). 
23 Brief Investeringsagenda, Kamerstukken II 2014/15, 31 066, nr. 236, pp. 2. 
24  König, E. (2016), ‘Waarom wil iedereen weg bij de Belastingdienst?’. Retrieved from: 
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2016/06/02/waarom-wil-iedereen-weg-bij-de-belastingdienst-1624089-a100913 
(visited on April 18th 2017). 
25  Belastingdienst (2016), ‘Waarborgen continuïteit en modernisering Belastingdienst’. Retrieved from: 
https://belastingdienst-in-beeld.nl/waarborgen-continuiteit-en-modernisering-belastingdienst/ (visited on April 
19th 2017). 
26 Wiebes, E. (2016), ‘Feitenrelaas bij vertrekregeling Belastingdienst’. Retrieved from: 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/publicaties/2016/10/12/feitenrelaas-bij-vertrekregeling-belastingdienst 
(visited on April 19th 2017). 
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5.1.3   Schiphol-fire 
The Schiphol-fire was an incident that occurred on the night of October 26th 2005. A fire, that 
took the lives of eleven detained immigrants, started in the K-Wing of a detention centre in 
Schiphol-Oost. Authorities assumed that an inmate had deliberately caused the fire, by 
throwing a burning cigarette in his trash can.27 The Dutch Safety Board, however, brought out 
a report that puts the blame on the organizations that were responsible for the detention 
center: the Custodial Institutions Agency (DJI) (in Dutch: Dienst Justitiële Inrichtingen) and 
the Government Buildings Agency (in Dutch: Rijksgebouwendienst).  
The report critiqued the actions of the organizations that led up to the fire, and their 
actions during, or even after the fire. The whole situation – from the evacuation of the people 
to the identification of the bodies – was chaotic. The conclusion of the report was that there 
would have been no (or less) deaths if the responsible parties (the DJI of the Ministry of 
Justice, The Government Buildings Agency of the Ministry of Housing (VROM) and the 
municipality of Haarlemmermeer) had followed the rules and regulations of fire safety.28 
Because of these critiques, the responsible ministers – minister Donner from the Ministry of 
Justice, and minister Dekker from the former Ministry of VROM – resigned on September 
21st 2006, even  before a debate was held with them about the report.    
As a result of the fire, the government set up a program for fire safety in order to 
prevent such incidents in the future. The program lays emphasis on the role of the responsible 
actors, a proactive attitude of these actors and a clear vision with regard to fire safety 
(Eindrapportage Actieprogramma Brandveiligheid, 2009). 
5.1.4   Pgb-debacle 
Pgb is a personal care budget system for people that cannot take care of themselves, either 
because of old age, illness or handicaps.29 People with a pgb get a budget and can choose a 
personal caretaker. Since January 1st 2005, the payment of the pgb-budgets is carried out by 
the Social Security Bank (in Dutch: Sociale Verzekeringsbank, SVB). They introduced a new 
payment system in which payments did not go directly to the caretaker, but via the SVB. 
After the SVB took over this responsibility ten thousands of pgb-caretakers did not receive 
                                                          
27 Trouw (N.B), ‘NFI betwijfelt oorzaak Schipholbrand’. Retrieved from: https://www.trouw.nl/home/nfi-
betwijfelt-oorzaak-schipholbrand~adb53f18/ (visited on April 21st 2017). 
28 Sturm, E. (2006), ‘Ministers Donner en Dekker treden af na rapport’. Retrieved from:  
https://www.trouw.nl/home/ministers-donner-en-dekker-treden-af-na-rapport~aecd0e31/ (visited on April 20th 
2017). 
29 Stokmans, D. & J. Wester (2017), ‘Van Rijn wist van excessen pgb, Kamer kreeg onvolledige informatie’. 
Retrieved from: https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2017/02/17/van-rijn-wist-van-excessen-pgb-kamer-kreeg-
onvolledige-informatie-6748780-a1546550 (visited on April 21st 2017). 
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their money for months. Another problem was that the SVB was paying out money without 
following the legal guidelines.   
 In this case, a total of 17 debates took place with undersecretary van Rijn of the 
Ministry of Public Health, between February 4th 2015 and February 23th 2017. Throughout all 
the debates, the main issue was that the parliament believed that the undersecretary was aware 
of the risks of the new payment system and the magnitude of the actual problems, but did not 
share truthful information.  
In a debate on March 26th 2015, a motion of no-confidence was filled against the 
undersecretary, whereby the opposition recited its trust. Van Rijn survived the motion, 
because the majority of the parliament did not support the motion.30 In a debate on April 29th 
2015, van Rijn promised that until May 15th 2015 he would ensure that all the caretakers got 
their salary.31 Van Rijn (May 18th 2015) was positive about the realization of that target. The 
suggestion for van Rijn to resign came up several times, but he survived all the debates that 
took place.32 To the contrary, the president of the Board of Directors of the SVB was laid off 
by undersecretary of Social Affairs, Mrs. Klijnsma on February 1st 2016.33 
 
5.2   Case results 
5.2.1   ProRail  
Parliament – Minister  
An analysis of the ProRail debate that took place on September 29th 2015,34 confirmed that 
the relation between undersecretary Mansveld and the parliament was problematic. In the 
debate, one member of parliament stated that the problems with ProRail were ongoing and 
that the list of incidents was never ending.35 The lack of communication between Mansveld 
and the parliament was a prominent issue in this debate.  
Figure 2 (presented on the following page) shows the presence of trust during the 
ProRail debate. We see that there was more distrust than low levels of trust between the 
parliament and undersecretary Mansveld.  
                                                          
30 Trouw (2015), ‘Motie van wantrouwen tegen van Rijn om pgb’. Retrieved from: 
https://www.trouw.nl/home/motie-van-wantrouwen-tegen-van-rijn-om-pgb~a61e5d8b/ (visited on April 21st 
2017). 
31 Handelingen II, 2014-2015, nr. 82, item 4, pp. 22. Problemen SVB met pgb’s. 
32 See for example: Handelingen II, 2014–2015, 25 657, nr. 147, pp. 12. Persoonsgebonden Budgetten [report], 
or: Handelingen II, 2016-2017, nr. 55, item 2. Vragenuur: vragen Keizer. 
33 NU (2016), ‘Voorzitter Sociale Verzekeringsbank ontslagen na pgb problemen’. Retrieved from: 
http://www.nu.nl/politiek/4202267/voorzitter-sociale-verzekeringsbank-ontslagen-pgb-problemen.html (visited 
on April 21st 2017). 
34 Handelingen II, 2015-2016, nr. 7, item 32, Debat over ProRail.  
35 Handelingen II, 2015-2016, nr. 7, item 32, pp. 13. 
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Figure 2 – The level of trust 
The fact that the parliament decided to have an external party investigate the debacle, shows 
that Mansveld was given the benefit of the doubt, while being increasingly monitored. At the 
end of the ProRail debate, the parliament similarly asked for an external investigation about 
the issues with ProRail. From this, we conclude that at the end of the ProRail debate the 
parliament distrusted Mansveld and that she did not restore the trust of the parliament.  
Figure 3 shows the ministerial performance of undersecretary Mansveld during the 
ProRail debate; her performance was not good. The figure shows that Mansveld was avoiding 
questions, more than she was providing answers. Members of the parliament continuously 
brought forward that Mansveld was not answering their questions. In an earlier debate on 
September 10th 2015, about the statement of Eringa that ProRail was ordered to delay bad 
news, Mansveld said the statement was “inconvenient”. It is still unclear if she actually 
ordered ProRail to handle problems this way, which indicates that she was not good at 
providing answers.  
 
Figure 3 – Ministerial performance 
She simultaneously struggled to take accountability for the problems with ProRail. 
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that were involved with ProRail, like the Board of Directors and the Supervisory Board.36 For 
instance, she would state that she was not aware of certain issues or facts because certain tasks 
were not her responsibility. 
At the end of the debate, the opposition parties recited their trust in Mansveld by filing 
a motion of no-confidence. This indicates that the opposition employed the damage-limitation 
strategy and attempted to reduce the possibility of being negatively surprised by Mansveld in 
the future, as she had done in the past (i.e. the deficit of 475 million Euros).  
Figure 4 shows that the parliament still used the tough-it-out strategy more than the 
damage-limitation strategy, perhaps because the distrust and the motion of no-confidence 
came mainly from the opposition parties – something we saw in all four cases. The fact that 
the parliament ordered her to provide more information for an upcoming debate illustrates the 
usage of the tough-it-out strategy, while the parliament actively tried to monitor Mansveld. 
The latter is a sign of distrust that was overly present in this debate. 
  
Figure 4 – Ministerial performance 
To conclude this matter, it was not the disappointment of the opposition that caused 
Mansveld to resign, but the assessment of the undersecretary herself. She, at the end of the 
ProRail debate, stated that she was motivated to step up and solve the problems. We believe 
that this motivation vanished when the Fyra-report came out a few weeks later and her role as 
undersecretary was again highly criticized. 
 Minister – Quango 
During the ProRail debate, the parliament wondered if Mansveld was really in charge of 
ProRail. It was stated that Mansveld lost control over ProRail and that this was the cause of 
the problems of ProRail. Moreover, ProRail had shown itself to be reluctant when it came to 
sharing information with their undersecretary. In some cases Mansveld did not know what 
                                                          
36 Handelingen II, 2015-2016, nr. 7, item 32, pp. 18. 
0
0.5
1
1.5
ProRail
Tough-it-out strategy
Damage-limitation strategy
 29 
Annie Svanishvili  To give up or to step up?  Leiden University 
was going on and in others she claimed that she was not responsible for certain issues.37 The 
fact that it was possible for ProRail to refuse to provide information, led to amazement of the 
parliament.38 This would make it hard for Mansveld to actively inform the parliament, while 
that has been an important issue in the past. This again illustrates that the relation between 
ProRail and the undersecretary was not optimal. This could have played part in the eventual 
de-autonomization of this organization. 
 
De-autonomization 
The position of ProRail was brought up multiple times during the ProRail debate. Members of 
the parliament wondered if the steering of ProRail would improve if the organization would 
be transitioned into the public domain. The continuation of problems created doubt about the 
earlier choice to privatize the organization. During the ProRail debate, Mansveld referred 
back to an earlier debate in 2013 where this issue was discussed elaborately.39 This debate 
shows that de-autonomization of ProRail was a topic that got serious attention before.  
It is therefore not surprising that the new undersecretary, Dijksma, eventually 
continued that practice and made a ZBO out of ProRail a year later; the parliament pleated for 
structural changes for years. ProRail itself was against a repositioning and was displeased 
when it actually took place.40 Even though these two parties were against Dijksma’s fast way 
of working, she still continued to set up a transitioning plan. This indicates that the 
undersecretary had the leading role in the de-autonomization of ProRail.  
We can add to that, that a problematic relationship between a quango and the 
responsible minister or undersecretary might play part in the repositioning, because it makes 
the steering even more difficult if the relationship is bad. A quango needs to be willing to 
share information and cooperate with an undersecretary in order to function well.  
 
5.2.2   Tax Administration 
  Parliament – Minister 
An analysis of the debate on October 13th 2016, one day after undersecretary Eric Wiebes put 
the organization under a legal restraint, shows an interesting picture. On the one hand, the 
                                                          
37 Handelingen II, 2015-2016, nr. 7, item 32, pp. 13. 
38 Handelingen II, 2015-2016, nr. 7, item 32, pp. 19. 
39 Handelingen II, 2015-2016, nr. 7, item 32, pp. 18. 
40 Essers, L. and R. Geeraedts (2016), ‘Personeel ProRail faliekant tegen ingrijpen overheid’. Retrieved from:  
http://www.rtlz.nl/algemeen/politiek/personeel-prorail-faliekant-tegen-ingrijpen-overheid (visited on March 3rd 
2017).  
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parliament wanted to get clarity from Wiebes about what went wrong and what Wiebes had 
planned for the future, indicating that the parliament was seeking to have their trust restored 
by Wiebes. On the other hand, the parliament questioned if Wiebes was able to solve the 
problems with Switch. The parliament, along with Wiebes himself, agreed that his actions 
mostly consisted of damage control. 
Figure 5 shows that during the debate there was rather a low level of trust than distrust 
from the parliament. This matches the position of the parliament in the first term of the 
debate; confused and disappointed, but open to hear the answers of the undersecretary. 
 
Figure 5 – The level of trust 
Continuing to figure 6, we show that Wiebes had good ministerial performance during the 
debate. Wiebes was not reluctant to take responsibility for the problems with Switch. He 
opened the second term of the debate by elaborately admitting that things went wrong under 
his responsibility and explaining how bad he felt about it.41 
 
Figure 6 – Ministerial performance 
                                                          
41 Handelingen II, 2016–2017, 31 066, nr. 313, pp. 24. 
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However, he had a tendency to also point out that the procedures were not followed (the green 
bar: minister avoids accountability or blames others), due to the informal culture of the Tax 
Administration, suggesting that he had done his job by setting up checks and balances, but 
that these procedures were simply not followed. 
Apart from that, his ministerial performance was great. Throughout the debate, he 
continued to answer questions with honesty, admitting the faults, taking the blame and trying 
to paint a transparent picture about the course of action during that problematic time where 
things went out of control. 
 
Figure 7 – The two strategies 
Figure 7 shows that the parliament barely used the damage-limitation strategy, while the 
mindset to let the undersecretary “tough it out” was strongly present. The debate truly 
revolved around filling in the blank spaces and providing (or getting) all the answers; it was 
about restoring trust. One Member of Parliament even stated that he felt that they were going 
in the right direction.42 
 Minister – Quango 
Even though Wiebes protected and praised the people that worked in the Tax Administration, 
the formal relationship between this undersecretary and the organization was problematic. 
Wiebes found himself not being informed in time, or through deficient memos.43 The fact that 
the procedures and the built in checks-and-balances were not followed, also illustrates that 
there was something wrong in this relationship. The parliament questioned why the Tax 
Administration was following their own (informal) procedures instead of the procedures that 
                                                          
42 Handelingen II, 2016–2017, 31 066, nr. 313, pp. 28. 
43 Handelingen II, 2016–2017, 31 066, nr. 313, pp. 38. 
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were recommended by Wiebes. The undersecretary believed that they felt that they knew 
better themselves, because they were the experts.44  
The resignation of the director general Hans Leijtens, who was recruited by Wiebes 
himself, on January 13th 2017, proves again that the relationship between Wiebes and the 
quango was not good. Leijtens resigned some time after Wiebes put the organization under 
legal restraint, partly because he failed to lead the reorganization in the right direction.45 His 
resignation could also be a signal to Wiebes that he did not agree with the legal restraint.46 
 De-autonomization 
In order to solve the tough informal and autonomous culture Wiebes concluded that he 
undertook the right measures by putting the financial decision making under a legal restraint. 
During the debate he stated that the legal restraint was the only way to fix this type of 
organizational culture.47 
 This was not the first time Wiebes noticed the autonomous culture in the organization. 
In April 2016 he already argued that the Tax Administration should be placed closer to the 
parent ministry, in order to increase control. During that time, he announced (Wiebes, April 
13th 2016) that he reduced the Board of Directors and the number of Works councils (from 23 
to 7). This earlier event shows that the legal restraint was not a decision he made on the spur 
of the moment; the undersecretary was aware of the informal culture and he found this to be a 
problem for several months. 
 
5.2.3   Schiphol-fire 
  Parliament – Minister  
An analysis of the first debate that we could find after the Schiphol-fire, the debate of 
November 10th 2005, provides some interesting results. While the ministers responsible for 
the reception and aftercare, minister Piet Hein Donner and minister Rita Verdonk,48 promised 
                                                          
44 Handelingen II, 2016–2017, 31 066, nr. 313, pp. 32. 
45 De Voogt, S. (2017), ‘Topman Belastingdienst weg na mislukte reorganisatie’. Retrieved from: 
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2017/01/13/topman-belastingdienst-weg-na-mislukte-reorganisatie-a1541146 (visited 
on May 6th 2017). 
46 Financieel Dagblad (2017), ‘Directeur-Generaal Belastingdienst stapt op’. Retrieved from: 
https://fd.nl/economie-politiek/1183017/directeur-generaal-belastingdienst-stapt-op (visited on May 7th 2017). 
47 Handelingen II, 2016–2017, 31 066, nr. 313, pp. 45. 
48 When continuing the analysis,  it should be noted that minister Sybilla Dekker did not take part in this debate. 
We only found one short debate, held on June 7th 2006 (Handelingen II, 2005-2006, nr. 100, pp. 6163-6168), 
during which the overall regulation of the former Ministry of Housing (VROM) was discussed. The Schiphol-fire 
was only referred to once, very briefly. The ministerial performance of Dekker and the level of trust that the 
parliament had in her with regard to the incident in Schiphol-Oost are, therefore, not observable. Luckily, the DJI 
for which Donner was responsible, played a larger part in the fire because this organization was directly 
responsible for the detention center, whereas VROM was only responsible for government buildings in general.  
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to provide good care for the survivors, the parliament received through the media that the 
aftercare was below measures. 
Figure 8 shows that low levels of trust were somewhat more present than distrust, but 
they are close (the table begins at 7.3% of the coded document). This is probably the case, 
because during the time of that debate, a lot was still unclear. 
 
Figure 8 – The level of trust 
The Dutch Safety Board would not bring out their report until a year later and the ministers 
themselves did not know the details about the fire. This showed itself through a mix of 
distrust and low levels of trust (of which trust is still the basis). We also clearly saw that the 
ministers were protected by the coalition parties. 
 Figure 9 concerns the ministerial performance of Donner. In this case, we added the 
unsuccessful restoration of trust as well, because the difference between a restoration of trust 
(0.79% of the coded document) and no restoration of trust (5.49% of the coded document) are 
striking, supposedly because of the ministerial performance of the minister.  
 
Figure 9  – Ministerial performance and the restoration of trust 
Even though the minister was answering the questions of the parliament, he had trouble with 
taking accountability for the problems that arose with the aftercare of the victims of the fire 
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The minister took particularly low accountability – 0.24% of the coded document – while he 
was actively trying to avoid accountability by simply denying the concerns of the parliament 
(1.85% of the coded document). In many occasions Donner expressed that the parliament was 
making wrong assumptions. In a particular occasion Donner took an almost superior attitude 
towards the parliament, claiming that the parliament was offending the care providers by 
being critical at every turn, therefore undermining the controlling function of the parliament.49 
 
Figure 10 – The two strategies 
Figure 10 shows that the parliament barely used the damage-limitation strategy, indicating 
that the parliament wanted to wait it out and see what the results of the report from the Dutch 
Safety Board would be, considering the timing of the debate. 
 We believe that Donner resigned, because he was tainted. Earlier in 2005 a man from a 
preventive detention center escaped during a supervised leave after which he killed a 73-year 
old man. Donner was responsible for patients in preventive detention centers. As a result of 
this incident, some members of the parliament found that Donner should resign. He, however, 
did not see any reason to resign, because the institutions acted according to the verdict of a 
judge to grant the man permission to a supervised leave.50 The incident with the detention 
center in Schiphol could have contributed to his resignation. 
 The upcoming elections could have also played a role in his decision to resign. In 
order to save some trust of the parliament and to be re-elected, he decided to take the ultimate 
responsibility by resigning. This was respected by the Minister-President, as well as the 
majority of the parliament. He probably knew that staying for the second time after an 
incident, would be highly criticized, which would diminish the chances of him being re-
elected in the upcoming elections. 
 
                                                          
49 Handelingen II, 2005-2006, nr. 20, pp. 1290. 
50 NU (2005), ‘Ontsnapte tbs’er opgepakt’. Retrieved from: http://www.nu.nl/algemeen/541547/ontsnapte-tbser-
opgepakt-video.html (visited on May 8th 2017).  
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 Minister – Quango  
Because there were no specific illustrations of the relationship between Donner or Dekker and 
their quangos, the relation between them did not appear to be problematic. Donner protected 
the DJI and the institutions responsible for the aftercare of the victims until the end. 
 The minister actively defended his aftercare policy (10.17% of the coded debate) while 
taking little responsibility for the problems that occured (0.24% of the coded debate). This 
either means that he protects the quango because he thinks highly of it, or that he simply does 
not like to admit to his faults. We tend to believe the latter, because in his statement of 
resignation he questioned to what extent ministers should be accountable for the mistakes of 
quangos,51distancing himself from the DJI by questioning his accountability. 
 De-autonomization 
After the Schiphol-fire neither the DJI nor the Government Buildings Agency were 
repositioned. Repositioning was not brought up in any debates about the Schiphol-fire, but 
fire safety received a great amount of attention. After the fire, the government established the 
Policy for Fire Safety (in Dutch: Actieprogramma Brandveiligheid) to create awareness about 
the importance of fire safety (Eindrapportage Actieprogramma Brandveiligheid, 2009). 
Besides that, the DJI and the Government Buildings Agency have established their own fire 
safety protocols (Opstelten, July 22nd 2013). The Policy further stated that the government 
further evaluated the fire safety of all government organizations (such as hospitals, schools 
and daycares) to ensure that people could be evacuated safely if a fire broke out. 
We believe that de-autonomization was not necessary, because the government took 
other fire safety measures. There were other possibilities to prevent such incidents and these 
were preferred over repositioning, possibly because these are easier and equally effective. 
5.2.4   Pgb-debacle 
  Parliament – Minister  
We analyzed the debate of June 4th 2015, in which a motion of no-confidence was filed 
against undersecretary van Rijn. It appears that the parliament was overall disappointed in the 
undersecretary, considering that this was the sixth debate about this issue. The members 
demanded answers from him, while others also wondered why he did not took his 
                                                          
51 NU (2006), ‘Donner en Dekker treden ook om slachtoffers af’. Retrieved from: 
http://www.nu.nl/algemeen/831285/donner-en-dekker-treden-ook-om-slachtoffers-af.html (visited on May 8th 
2017). 
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responsibility by resigning.52 A combination of obvious distrust and low levels of trust clearly 
came forward during the debate, as is supported by figure 11. 
 
Figure 11 – The level of trust 
During this debate we again saw an obvious contrast between a distrusting opposition and a 
protective coalition. Members of Parliament speculated about a motion of no-confidence even 
beforehand the debate. It was also clear that the coalition parties would not support such a 
motion.  
 As pictured by figure 12, van Rijn performed good during this debate. He began the 
second term of the debate by taking full accountability and showing emotions (e.g. “That’s 
why it hurts …”).53 Throughout the debate, he apologizes for the problems four times, which 
he has also done in earlier debates about this issue. The parliament appreciated his apologies: 
“At least he apologized for how it all went”.54 
 
Figure 12 – Ministerial performance 
                                                          
52 Handelingen II 2014-2015, nr. 92, item 4, pp. 4. Uitbetaling van de pgb’s. 
53 Handelingen II 2015-2016, nr. 92, item 7, pp 1. Uitbetaling van de pgb’s. 
54 Handelingen II 2015-2016, nr. 92, item 7, pp 5. 
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The combination of taking accountability (3.02%), defending his actions and policy (7.15%) 
and apologizing (0.29%)  is one we did not see in the other debates. 
 Figure 13 shows that, also in this case, the parliament employed the tough-it-out 
strategy over the damage-limitation strategy.   
 
Figure 13 – The two strategies 
For the parliament, it was clear that a motion of no-confidence was going to be filled,55 but it 
was also clear beforehand that the two coalition parties would not support the motion.56 So, 
even though distrust was somewhat higher than a low level of trust, and a motion of no-
confidence was filled, the opposition knew that the undersecretary would not resign. The best 
thing to do during the debate, therefore, was to hear the undersecretary out and to determine 
what he was planning to do to improve the situation. 
 To conclude, a significant part of the parliament indicated that the trust in the 
undersecretary was not restored. However, the support of the coalition parties were enough 
for the undersecretary to not resign. The undersecretary was secured of his position because 
he had a good relation with the coalition parties. 
 Minister – Quango 
Even though the SVB performed badly and trust was damaged, the parliament did not put the 
blame on this quango; it was put on the undersecretary who incorrectly informed the 
parliament and ignored warnings from the SVB and others. The undersecretary was 
questioned as to why he did not listen to the SVB.57 This indicates that the actions of the SVB 
were not perceived as bad, but as good. The PvdA stated that the SVB is working hard, 
thereby praising the organization and its effort.58 
                                                          
55 Handelingen II 2015-2016, nr. 92, item 7, pp 36. 
56 Handelingen II 2014-2015, nr. 92, item 4, pp. 1. 
57 Handelingen II 2015-2016, nr. 92, item 7, pp 11. 
58 Handelingen II 2015-2016, nr. 92, item 4, pp 9. 
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The undersecretary also did not put the blame on the SVB. When the PVV filed a 
motion to have the board of directors of the SVB fired, the undersecretary rejected the motion, 
praised the SVB and stated that he trusted the SVB to the fullest. He, further, assured the 
parliament that the SVB was working as hard as ever and was motivated to solve the 
problems.59 
De-autonomization 
The issue of de-autonomization did not occur in the debate of June 4th. The only issue that 
resembles de-autonomization, was the proposal from Leiten (SP) to let caretakers be 
responsible for their own budget, instead of the SVB, until the problems would be solved.60 
The undersecretary did not respond to this request. 
 The SVB is still responsible for the payout of pgb caretakers, and it has been 
throughout the entire debacle. We can also argue that a repositioning would not do the 
situation any good. The payout of pgb’s was already unstable and there were a great deal of 
uncertainties; (discussions about) de-autonomization would only add to the instability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
59 Handelingen II 2015-2016, nr. 92, item 7, pp 34. 
60 Handelingen II 2015-2016, nr. 92, item 4, pp 3. 
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6  Comparative Analysis  
In this chapter, we will present the results from our comparison of the four cases, starting with 
an overview of the number of interactions between parliament and the designated ministers or 
undersecretaries in each case, presented in table 4.   
Number of interactions                                                                                                     Table 4 
 Debates Motions 
(sadness, 
disapproval, no-
confidence) 
Chamber 
questions/letters  
Total (debates + 
chamber 
questions/letters) 
ProRail 
(2013-2015) 
 
 
(2015-2016) 
Problems and 
turnover 
Mansveld: 
9 
Repositioning of 
ProRail: 
8 
2 
(motions of no-
confidence) 
Problems and 
turnover 
Mansveld: 
31 
Repositioning of 
ProRail: 
11 
Problems and 
turnover 
Mansveld: 
40 
Repositioning of 
ProRail: 
19 
Tax 
Administration 
(2015-2016) 
9 0 20 29 
Schiphol-fire 
(2005-2006) 
9 0 17 26 
Pgb-debacle 
(2015-2017) 
17 2 
(motions of no-
confidence) 
36 53 
 
The table shows that 9 debates occurred in the cases of ProRail, the Tax Administration and 
the Schiphol-fire, while during the pgb-debacle 17 debates were held with undersecretary van 
Rijn. The parliament filed four motions of no-confidence in these four cases; two against 
undersecretary Mansveld in the case of ProRail, and two during the pgb-debacle against 
undersecretary van Rijn. No motions of sadness or disapproval were filled by the parliament 
in these cases.  
With regard to the letters and Chamber questions that were exchanged between the 
parliament and the ministers, again the cases of ProRail (31) and the pgb-debacle (36) show 
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the highest numbers. The table in Appendix 1 shows an overview of all the debates, and the 
time between debates. We see that after the incidents occurred and after important reports 
were published, the time between debates became shorter: more debates were held in shorter 
periods of time.  
The data provided in table 4, however, do not give any clear answers to our questions. 
They rather confirm that the issue of political and organizational changes after incidents needs 
to be analyzed, because the cases with the highest number of interactions are the cases that 
show opposite consequences. While the pgb-debacle is the case with the highest number of 
interactions, ProRail is the runner-up. So in these two cases the number of interactions has 
both been high, while the consequences of the problems have been the opposite. In order to 
get more answers an in-depth analysis of the deciding debates is presented in the following 
chapters, starting with the issue of ministerial turnover before continuing to the issue of de-
autonomization. 
 
6.1    Ministerial turnover  
6.1.1   The level of trust and the two strategies 
A comparative analysis of the deciding debates of all the cases shows that distrust was the 
highest in the case of the Schiphol-fire (7.45% of the coded document) and the lowest in the 
case of the Tax Administration (3.25% of the coded document). In the cases of ProRail and 
the pgb-debacle, the level of distrust was somewhat equal (around the 4%). Comparison 1 
further shows that in all the cases the tough-it-out strategy was used more than the damage-
limitation strategy.  
 
Comparison  1 – Trust and the two strategies 
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 41 
Annie Svanishvili  To give up or to step up?  Leiden University 
The comparison shows some results that contradict our expectations. We see that low levels 
of trust were slightly higher than distrust in the case of the Schiphol-fire, while in the case of 
the pgb-debacle distrust was higher than low levels of trust.  
The results show that the parliament did pressure the ministers or undersecretaries by 
showing distrust in them, even if the tough-it-out strategy was employed more often in all 
four cases. The fact that distrust was the highest in the case of the Schiphol-fire – where the 
ministers resigned – and lowest in the case of the Tax Administration – where Wiebes is still 
the undersecretary – would imply that distrust is a necessary condition for ministerial 
turnover. The case of ProRail similarly shows a higher level of distrust than low levels of 
trust. However, in the debate about the pgb-debacle, the level of distrust was also slightly 
higher than low levels of trust, while this debacle did not lead to the resignation of van Rijn. 
We can therefore state that distrust is not a necessary, but certainly a sufficient condition for 
ministerial turnover, because having the parliament openly distrust the capabilities of a 
minister, weighs a toll on the motivation of that minister in the long run, which could in turn 
influence ministerial turnover.  
As for the two strategies that the parliament could employ, we see that the damage-
limitation strategy is used less than the tough-it-out strategy in all four cases. This implies 
that the parliament is overall willing to hear the minister out and see her solve the problems, 
even if distrust was higher in those cases. On the other hand, this result could also mean that 
the influence of the parliament over the position of a minister is limited; in the end it is still 
the minister that decides if she resigns. Distrust does not always lead to the usage of the 
damage-limitation strategy because it does not always lead to actual damage-limitation, an 
argument that the D66 brought forward in the debate of June 4th 2015, about the pgb 
debacle.61 All in all, we see that the use of the damage-limitation strategy is not necessarily 
linked to distrust, nor are low levels of trust necessarily linked to the tough-it-out strategy.  
The damage-limitation strategy is, further, not a necessary condition for ministerial 
turnover; the tough-it-out strategy was employed more often, even in the cases that showed 
ministerial turnover. Perhaps the tough-it-out strategy is preferred over the damage-limitation 
strategy because ministerial turnover is a matter that could negatively influence the political 
stability of a cabinet. It is therefore undesirable to replace the designated undersecretary or 
minister while a quango is already functioning badly.  
                                                          
61 Handelingen II, 2014-2015, nr. 47, item 7, pp. 37. Uitbetaling van de pgb’s.  
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So, even though the link between the level of trust and strategies that the parliament 
can employ seemed logical in theory, in practice we see that these issues are tangled. Because 
of this, we argue that the distinction between these issues – the level of trust on the one side 
and the strategies on the other side – can only offer a handhold in understanding the actions 
and attitudes of the parliament when trust in ministers or undersecretaries is (severely) 
damaged.  
It further appeared that distrust and low levels of trust existed simultaneously in the 
parliament. The results also show it: distrust and low levels of trust were somewhat equal 
during the Schiphol-fire and the pgb-debacle. Besides that, it was mainly the opposition that 
showed signs of distrust and attempts to use damage-limitation. The motions of no-confidence 
that were filed in the cases of ProRail (2 motions) and the pgb-debacle (2 motions) were filed 
by opposition parties. During the pgb-debate of June 2nd 2015, the SP filed the motion.62 This 
party similarly filed the motion of no-confidence during the debate of March 26th 2015.63 
During the ProRail debate of September 29th 2015, the PVV filed the motion.  
It seems that the coalition parties tried to protect the ministers and undersecretaries. 
This most clearly came forward during Schiphol debate and the pgb debate. During the 
Schiphol debate, it were mostly the coalition parties that were satisfied with the answers of 
Minister Donner. Besides that, van Rijn from the pgb-debacle was backed up by the PvdA and 
the VVD, even before the debate took place. So here we see that distrust and low levels of 
trust can exist simultaneously. 
Based on the above, we argue that the parliament can influence a minister’s decision to 
either resign or stay, but that the attitude from the parliament is not the deciding factor in 
ministerial turnover. Distrust from the parliament did not always lead to ministerial turnover, 
and low levels of trust did not always prevent ministerial turnover. We also looked into other 
concepts that could explain ministerial turnover. 
6.1.2   Ministerial performance 
During the analysis we also focused on ministerial performance, a minister being tainted or 
clean and the timing of the incidents. We start with presenting comparison 2, which shows the 
ministerial performance of each minister during the deciding debates. Taking accountability 
                                                          
62 Van den Dool, P. (2015), ‘Motie van wantrouwen tegen van Rijn verworpen, maar steun van CDA’. Retrieved 
from: https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/06/04/motie-van-wantrouwen-tegen-van-rijn-verworpen-maar-steun-van-
cda-en-groenlinks-a1415778 (visited on May 18th 2017). 
63 Trouw (2015), ‘Motie van wantrouwen tegen van Rijn om pgb’. Retrieved from: 
https://www.trouw.nl/home/motie-van-wantrouwen-tegen-van-rijn-om-pgb~a61e5d8b/ (visited on May 18th 
2017). 
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for the problems of the quango and adequately answering questions are signs of good 
ministerial performance. Avoiding accountability, for example by blaming others or denying 
the problems, and avoiding questions of the parliament are signs of bad ministerial 
performance. 
Comparison 2 shows that the cases with the best ministerial performance are the cases 
of the Tax Administration and the pgb-debacle (these are similarly the cases that did not show 
ministerial turnover). In these cases, the undersecretaries took full accountability for the 
problems with the quangos. Wiebes of the Tax Administration was avoiding questions, but 
answered them when confronted with it (the two bars are equal). 
 
Comparison  2 - Ministerial performance 
Van Rijn was slightly better at answering questions and he even apologized during multiple 
debates. Wiebes attempted to answer the questions truthfully and both he and van Rijn 
showed emotions and voiced how regretful they were about the problematic performance of 
the Tax Administration and the SVB. 
 We see that Mansveld from ProRail and Donner from the DJI were reluctant to take 
accountability for what went wrong, and were rather trying to avoid being held accountable. 
While Mansveld stated multiple times that she was not responsible for certain tasks, hiding 
behind other actors in the field, Donner was trying to deny that any of the problems that the 
parliament brought forward were true.  
Based on this, we believe that good ministerial performance can have a positive 
influence on the position of a minister or undersecretary. We argue that ministerial turnover is 
linked to the capabilities of the minister; if a minister acknowledges his accountability, 
apologizes and answers the questions of the parliament, the opinion of the parliament about 
the minister – either characterized by low levels of trust (skepticism) or distrust (assured 
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belief of bad intentions) – improves (in the case of the Tax Administration) or is simply not 
that relevant anymore (in the case of the pgb-debacle).  
6.1.3  Clean and tainted ministers 
Continuing to the principal of tainted and clean ministers, it becomes even clearer that the role 
of the parliament in ministerial turnover is not as significant as we thought. Undersecretary 
Mansveld, as well as minister Donner were involved in incidents in the past. Mansveld had a 
longer history of problems with ProRail. The incident in 2013 in which she did not share an 
important internal report with the parliament, was referred to multiple times during the 
ProRail debate.64 She had problems with ProRail and the Fyra even before the news about the 
potential deficit of 475 million Euros came out in 2015.  
As we discussed earlier, Donner was similarly involved in a serious incident earlier in 
2005, when a man that was imposed with compulsory psychiatric treatment escaped during 
his supervised leave from a preventive detention center and killed a 73-year old man. This 
incident, however, was not brought up during the Schiphol debate.  
The detention center in Schiphol-Oost also had problems before. There had been 
warnings about the fire safety of the detention center in Schiphol-Oost. Between 2002 and 
2005, there were nine mentions of a fire in the building.65 These earlier incidents with the 
detention center were brought up during debates that discussed the critical report of the Dutch 
Safety board in 2006.66 
We see that Wiebes and van Rijn (the two clean ministers) were still functioning as 
undersecretaries, while Mansveld and Donner resigned right after (yet) another hiccup 
occurred – critical reports, in their case – while all the ministers claimed to be ‘extremely 
motivated’ to move forward. A majority of the former incidents was mentioned in the 
deciding debates, which indicates that the parliament found these earlier incidents to be 
relevant in their estimation of the capabilities of the ministers and undersecretary. But apart 
from that, being tainted can be problematic for the minister herself. It is understandable that 
having incidents occur during a government term weighs a toll on ministers and 
undersecretaries, because they have to defend themselves and their choices regarding that 
incident.  
                                                          
64 Zuidervaart, B. (2013), ‘Mansveld hield problemen bij spoor achter’. Retrieved from: 
https://www.trouw.nl/home/mansveld-hield-problemen-bij-spoor-achter~abcd4554/ (visited on April 16th 2017). 
65 Zuidervaart, B. (2006), ‘Reconstructie/ De brand begon al in 2002’. Retrieved from:  
https://www.trouw.nl/home/reconstructie-de-brand-begon-al-in-2002~a9b4f1ff/ (visited on April 21st 2017).   
66  Handelingen II, 2006-2007, 1117-1144, pp. 1128. Behandeling van het rapport Brand cellencomplex 
Schiphol-Oost. 
 45 
Annie Svanishvili  To give up or to step up?  Leiden University 
Clean ministers have more credibility (they have done nothing wrong yet), which in 
turn can increase their motivation to go forward. The number of debates supports this 
assumption. The number of debates during the pgb-debacle, that involves a clean 
undersecretary, was the highest of all four cases (17), while the other cases showed 9 debates. 
In the debate with Wiebes about Switch, he argued that the whole working processes of the 
Tax Administration should be improved and that he was willing to put all his energy into this 
process.67 Donner lacked the enthusiasm of Wiebes, that was also present by van Rijn68 and 
even by Mansveld.69 Donner questioned if the debate of November 10th was even necessary, 
which was inappropriate according to the president of that debate.70 This, along with him 
denying that the aftercare of the victims of the fire was below measures, can be interpreted as 
him having a lack of drive to debate about yet another disaster that took place under his 
responsibility.  
We observed that the issue of tainted and clean ministers is a combination of the 
feelings from the parliament and the minister herself; is the former incident an issue for the 
parliament, but most importantly to what extent does the minister take it to heart? It is the 
minister that needs to solve the problems, steer the quango and account for all its actions to 
the parliament. We see that even distrust and motions of no-confidence do not automatically 
lead to ministerial turnover. While the parliament can exert pressure over a minister, it is the 
motivation of a minister herself to decide whether or not she is capable and willing to keep 
putting effort in solving the problems.  
Furthermore, we saw that in the cases with clean undersecretaries, Wiebes and van 
Rijn, there was another commonality: in both cases a top-member of the quangos was fired. In 
the case of the Tax Administration, director general Hans Leijtens was fired because he failed 
to lead Switch in the right direction. After the legal restraint on the Tax Administration, 
Leijtens was reduced in his autonomies and he did not have much work to do anymore.71 In 
the case of the pgb-debacle, the president of the Board of Directors of SVB, Nicoly 
                                                          
67 Handelingen II, 2016–2017, 31 066, nr. 313, pp. 46. Investeringsagenda Belastingdienst. 
68 Handelingen II, 2014-2015, nr. 92, item 4, pp. 33. Uitbetaling van de pgb’s. 
69  Nieuws (2015), ‘Mansveld extra gemotiveerd om door te gaan’. Retrieved from: 
https://nieuws.nl/algemeen/20150930/mansveld-extra-gemotiveerd-om-door-te-gaan/ (visited on May 22nd 
2017). 
70 Handelingen II, 2005-2006, nr. 20, pp. 1288. De opvang van de slachtoffers van de brand in het 
detentiecentrum Schiphol. 
71 De Voogt, S. (2017), ‘Topman Belastingdienst weg na mislukte reorganisatie’. Retrieved from: 
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2017/01/13/topman-belastingdienst-weg-na-mislukte-reorganisatie-a1541146 (visited 
on May 30th 2017).  
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Vermeulen was laid off, because “a new phase needed new leadership”.72 It seems that these 
undersecretaries, which are the undersecretaries that did not resign, made other prominent 
actors take their responsibility, while they convinced the parliament that they were the right 
individuals to steer the quango in the right direction and solve the problems.  
6.1.4   Timing of the incident and debate 
Lastly, we analyzed the timing of the debates and incidents, and found that this issue does not 
determine whether or not a minister resigns, but can rather contribute to ministerial turnover. 
We found that the resignation of Donner (and Dekker) took place shortly before the elections. 
The report of the Dutch Safety Board was presented during the third cabinet of Balkenende 
(2006-2007), which was an outgoing cabinet that resigned two months after the critical 
report.73 We already argued that the resignation of Donner must have been a strategic choice, 
in order to get a spot in the new cabinet of Balkenende IV, which he eventually did. The 
timing of the Schiphol-fire also contributed to the status of the minister; he was already 
tainted due to the incident with the escaped man that took place earlier in 2005. He was 
Minister of Security and Justice since 2002, which means that both incidents took place close 
to the end of the government term; in the third year of his tenure74.  
The debate with Wiebes about Switch, similarly took place with the elections in sight. 
During the debate of October 13th 2016, a member of the parliament referred to the upcoming 
elections of March 15th 2017 to argue that another member was using campaign rhetoric 
during the debate.75 Wiebes was not tainted, possibly because he was undersecretary for a 
short period of time when Switch was introduced. He became undersecretary after the former 
undersecretary Frans Weekers resigned on January 29th 2014. Wiebes introduced the 
reorganization of the Tax Administration a year later in 2015.76 During that short period of 
time he has become tainted, due to the failure of Switch, but he was clean before that. The fact 
that he undertook action by placing the Tax Administration closer to the Ministry of Finance, 
must have contributed to him still being the undersecretary of this ministry. 
                                                          
72 Zandstra, P. (2016), ‘Topvrouw van Sociale Verzekeringsbank ontslagen’. Retrieved from: 
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2016/01/22/topvrouw-van-sociale-verzekeringsbank-treedt-terug-a1409918 (visited 
on May 30th 2017). 
73  Parlement & Politiek (N.B), ‘Kabinet Balkenende III (2006-2007)’. Retrieved from: 
https://www.parlement.com/id/vhnnmt7m2000/kabinet_balkenende_iii_2006_2007 (visited on May 8th 2017).  
74 Parlement & Politiek (N.B), ‘Prof. Mr. J. P. H. (Piet Hein) Donner’. Retrieved from: 
https://www.parlement.com/id/vg9fgopqa1o0/j_p_h_piet_hein_donner (visited on May 8th 2017). 
75 Handelingen II, 2016–2017, 31 066, nr. 313, pp. 10. Investeringsagenda Belastingdienst. 
76 Belastingdienst (2016), ‘Waarborgen continuïteit en modernisering Belastingdienst’. Retrieved from: 
https://belastingdienst-in-beeld.nl/waarborgen-continuiteit-en-modernisering-belastingdienst/ (visited on April 
19th 2017). 
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We already established that Mansveld became a tainted undersecretary early on in her 
tenure that lasted from 2012 until 2015. The Fyra debacle in 2012, along with the important 
report that was not shared with the parliament in 2013 made her a tainted undersecretary. The 
problems with ProRail and undersecretary Mansveld were at their highest in 2015. The Fyra-
report also came out at the end of this year.  
The pgb-debacle similarly started in 2015 when the new payment system was 
introduced. This debacle shows similarities with the case of the Tax Administration, because 
just like Wiebes, van Rijn was a clean minister, even though he is undersecretary of the 
Ministry of Health for a longer time than Wiebes, since November 2012.  
Considering that the tainted ministers, Mansveld and Donner were both 
undersecretaries for a long period of time (both for three years), while clean undersecretary 
Wiebes was only one year in, would confirm the assumption that the end of a government 
term contributes to a minister being tainted. The longer a minister is responsible for certain 
quangos, the higher the chances are that she becomes tainted. However, again the pgb-debacle 
shows some contradiction. Van Rijn who also was undersecretary for three years after the 
pgb-debacle begun, shows that he was not tainted before this debacle. Still, we can assume 
that the length of a ministerial tenure can contribute to her being tainted, because three of the 
four cases show results that support this assumption. 
6.2   De-autonomization 
We assumed that the level of trust between the parliament and the designated undersecretary 
or minister would influence de-autonomization. On the one hand, we argued that low levels of 
trust would not lead to de-autonomization, while on the other hand we thought that distrust 
would result in de-autonomization. We also believed that ministerial turnover could trigger 
de-autonomization for several reasons, for instance to ensure the new-found trust, to reduce 
the workload for the new minister or to prevent incidents with the quango in the future.  
Comparison 3 (presented on the following page) shows the level of trust and whether 
or not de-autonomization and ministerial turnover took place in our cases. We see that low 
levels of trust were higher than distrust in the case of the Tax Administration and in the case 
of the Schiphol-fire. In these cases, trust was damaged but there was still a foundation of trust 
between the parliament and the ministers and undersecretary Wiebes. The other two cases 
show more distrust than low levels of trust. We see that in the case of ProRail the parliament 
was overly critical and negative towards the designated undersecretary, while distrust is only 
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slightly higher in the case of the pgb-debacle, illustrating the persistent disapproval of the 
opposition parties.   
 
Comparison  3 - Trust, de-autonomization and ministerial turnover 
We expected that ministerial turnover could operate as a moderating factor, meaning 
that ministerial turnover would trigger discussions about de-autonomization. We saw this 
process in the case of ProRail, where de-autonomization took place one year after the 
resignation of undersecretary Mansveld. Discussions about repositioning took place years 
before the actual process was set in motion. In the case of the Tax Administration, 
undersecretary Wiebes, similarly argued for de-autonomization some time before he actually 
repositioned the organization, due to its informal and autonomous culture that was the cause 
for all the problems surrounding Switch. Here, the resignation of former undersecretary Frans 
Weekers in 2014 could have also contributed to the decision of Wiebes to de-autonomize the 
Tax Administration. 
6.2.1  Additional results: third layer relationship and history of the quango 
Because we did not get the results that we anticipated on with regard to de-autonomization 
(this will be elaborated in the following chapter: Discussion), we go over additional results 
that came forward during the analysis, in order to try to explain the issue of de-
autonomization in that way.  
We found that the relationship between the minister or undersecretary and a quango 
(the third layer of principal-agent relationships) is of great importance when it comes to de-
autonomization. A good relationship between quango and minister can protect a quango from 
losing autonomy after incidents. We saw that the SVB, responsible for the payout of pgb 
budgets, had a good relation with undersecretary van Rijn as well as with the parliament. The 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
ProRail Tax
Administration
Schiphol-fire Pgb-debacle
Low level of trust
Distrust
De-autonomization
Ministerial turnover
 49 
Annie Svanishvili  To give up or to step up?  Leiden University 
undersecretary stated in the debate of June 4th 2015 that he trusted the SVB.77 The parliament 
did have problems with van Rijn himself, but not with the quango. 
 Likewise, the DJI that is responsible for detention centers had a good relationship 
with minister Donner. Even though this case ended with ministerial turnover, the relationship 
between the minister and the quango did not appear to be problematic by all means. The 
minister defended the actions of the guards and the people that provided aftercare for victims 
until the Dutch Safety Board presented the critical report. 
Subsequently, we see that in the cases that showed de-autonomization, the 
relationships between the undersecretaries and the quangos were problematic. Mansveld had 
major problems with ProRail, mainly with communicating and sharing relevant information, 
and Wiebes encountered similar problems with the Tax Administration; Switch was 
established without following formal procedures and checks and balances and the 
organization similarly failed to proactively inform Wiebes. Because of this, we believe that 
the relationship that the quango has with the designated minister or undersecretary is of great 
importance when it comes to the autonomy of quangos; the better the quango cooperates with 
the minister, the less likely it is that the autonomies of the quango will be reduced after 
incidents or bad performance.  
Besides that, we noticed that ministerial turnover can have a mediating effect on de-
autonomization. We saw that the resignation of undersecretary Mansveld in the case of 
ProRail stimulated discussions about a repositioning of the organization even further. We saw 
something similar in the case of the Tax Administration, where former undersecretary 
Weekers resigned in 2014. Wiebes found (and argued) that the culture in the Tax 
Administration was too autonomous and was leading to problems. Even in the case of the 
Schiphol-fire, we saw that – even though de-autonomization did not take place – several 
protocols and projects were launched to increase fire safety in government buildings after the 
critical report about the fire was published and the ministers resigned, increasing some control 
over this matter.  
This assumption can further be confirmed, when looking at the pgb-debacle, where no 
ministerial turnover took place; the designated undersecretary, drs. Marlies Veldhuizen van 
Zanten, finished her term in 2012 and made place for a new person in the next government 
                                                          
77 Handelingen II 2014-2015 , item 92. Nr. 7, pp. 43. Uitbetaling van de pgb’s. 
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term.78 Only one comment was made about shifting responsibility for budgets to the care 
takers themselves, which was however ignored by the undersecretary. 
 We also found that de-autonomization does not happen out of the blue, but is rather an 
evolution of concerns that were present by the ministers or designated undersecretaries for 
longer periods of time, before eventually resulting in the reduction of autonomies. It is not a 
coincidence that in the cases that did show de-autonomization, this matter was raised and 
discussed before, either by the designated minister, undersecretary of even by the parliament. 
In the ProRail debate of September 29th 2015 Mansveld referred to an earlier debate in which 
the position of ProRail was elaborately discussed. Several external parties looked into the 
consequences that a repositioning would bring, before the actual de-autonomization took 
place (see for example: Boston Consulting Group, 2016) Similarly, in the debate with Wiebes 
on October 13th 2016, he mentioned that he had raised the autonomous culture of the 
organization before.79 No such claims were done in (the deciding) debates about the pgb-
debacle or the Schiphol-fire; the cases where there was no de-autonomization of the quangos. 
 Therefore, we can conclude that the history of the quango and the relationships that the 
quango has with its primary principle (the minister or undersecretary) are extremely relevant 
in explaining the phenomenon of de-autonomization. In order to see in what direction the 
quango is heading, one should closely study the path that the organization has covered during 
the years. We believe that de-autonomization is something that can be anticipated on – 
reducing the shock for a quango or changing the negative attitude of a quango towards this 
issue – if the signals are recognized and acknowledged along the way.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
78 Parlement & Politiek (N.B), ‘Drs. M.L.L.E. (Marlies) Veldhuijzen van Zanten-Hyllner’. Retrieved from: 
https://www.parlement.com/id/vijdmkvn4uz4/m_l_l_e_marlies_veldhuijzen_van_zanten (visited on 
May 26th 2017). 
79 Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 31066, nr. 269. Aanbiedingsbrief 17e Halfjaarsrapportage Belastingdienst op 14 
maart 2016. 
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7  Discussion 
From the analysis we saw that in the four cases that we analyzed, the role of the parliament 
was not as prominent as we expected in both ministerial turnover – where the minister played 
a major role – and in de-autonomization – where the third principal-agent layer between 
minister and quango proved to be more significant than the relationship between the 
designated minister and the parliament.  
With the analysis we tried to clarify the influence of several concepts on ministerial 
turnover and de-autonomization; the level of trust (low levels of trust or distrust), the two 
strategies (tough-it-out strategy and damage-limitation strategy), ministerial performance, the 
principal of tainted and clean ministers and the timing of the debate. These are elaborated in 
the following sections. 
7.1   The level of trust  
Starting with low levels of trust we saw that hypothesis 2 can be rejected. This hypothesis 
stated that low levels of trust would less likely lead to ministerial turnover, because with low 
levels of trust there is still a foundation of trust (van de Walle and Six, 2014: 169). Even 
though negative perceptions about the actions of the other party might rise, the actions of the 
parties that are involved are not likely to change in this situation.  
The cases of ProRail and the Tax Administration showed results that would confirm 
our assumptions; distrust was higher in the case of ProRail (where Mansveld was actively 
monitored after her last debate) and low levels of trust were higher in the case of the Tax 
Administration (where the parliament wanted Wiebes to take away their doubts).  
The cases of the Schiphol-fire and the pgb-debacle showed results that (slightly) 
contradicted out assumptions about low levels of trust. In the case of the Schiphol-fire, we 
saw that low levels of trust and distrust were the highest of all cases and the difference 
between the two concepts was very small; low levels of trust were slightly more present than 
distrust. This shows that the parliament was very divided during that debate. In the end, the 
ministers still resigned. The pgb-debacle shows similar findings. Here, distrust was slightly 
higher than low levels of trust – illustrating the divided parliament – and the undersecretary 
did not resign. Because of the results of these two cases we cannot confirm hypothesis 2. 
From the results we conclude that low levels of trust do not necessarily prevent ministerial 
turnover, but can support the minister in her decision to not resign, making low levels of trust 
a sufficient condition to prevent ministerial turnover.  
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 For de-autonomization, it is also debatable whether or not low levels of trust protect a 
quango from de-autonomization. Based on the theory (van de Walle and Six, 2014: 169), we 
assumed that low levels of trust would not lead to increased control over the quango. In the 
comparative analysis, we saw that the Tax Administration showed de-autonomization, while 
the presence of low levels of trust was higher than distrust, which contradicts our assumption. 
The pgb-debacle similarly showed contradictory results. The case of ProRail, however, 
showed results that fit our assumptions: distrust was higher than low levels of trust in this 
case, and de-autonomization took place. The case of the Schiphol-fire also fits the 
assumptions – low levels of trust were slightly higher than distrust and there was no de-
autonomization. Because the results of the pgb-debacle and the Tax Administration were not 
in line with our hypothesis, we cannot confirm hypothesis 3. The presence of low levels of 
trust does not necessarily prevent de-autonomization, but in some cases it can. However, this 
depends on other variables, such as the relationship between the minister and the quango. 
 Moving on to distrust, we see again that the results are not unanimous. Hypothesis 5 
stated that distrust between the parliament and minister would increase the likelihood of 
ministerial turnover, because the actions of the actors would change when (low levels of) trust 
turned into distrust (van Thiel and Yesilkagit, 2011: 788). We argue that distrust is not a 
necessary, but a sufficient condition for ministerial turnover when we look at the results of the 
analysis. As for ProRail and the Tax Administration the findings fit the assumptions about 
distrust, low levels of trust and ministerial turnover. The Schiphol-fire and the pgb-debacle do 
not fit the assumptions. We therefore argue that distrust can be a sufficient condition for 
ministerial turnover, because distrust negatively influenced the motivation of the minister to 
solve the problems. 
For de-autonomization in combination with distrust, we saw a similar process. 
Hypothesis 6 stated that if distrust was higher than low levels of trust, this would  lead to de-
autonomization. Distrust was higher than low levels of trust in the case of ProRail and the 
case showed both de-autonomization. Also, in the case of the Schiphol-fire, low levels of trust 
were higher than distrust and de-autonomization did not take place. The Tax Administration, 
however, showed results that were not in line with the hypothesis: distrust was less present 
than low levels of trust and de-autonomization still took place. The same goes for the pgb-
debacle. Therefore, this hypothesis is rejected; the level of trust between the parliament and 
the minister does not explain de-autonomization. 
Based on the results, theory about the levels of trust, the usage of the two strategies 
and its effects on behavior seem not be fully applicable to the principal-agent relationships in 
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this study. We saw that the damage-limitation strategy, as offered Tompson and Tillotsen 
(1999), is not used by the parliament, at least not in our cases. We saw that the parliament can 
at most pressure a minister to resign or a quango to be de-autonomized by discussing these 
issues during important debates. In the end, this pressure that shows itself through distrust and 
damage-limitation does not necessarily lead to ministerial turnover or de-autonomization. 
Even though literature about ministerial turnover found the parliament to have a leading role 
specifically in ministerial turnover (Berlinksi, Dewan and Dowding, 2010; Fisher, 2012: 60), 
we saw that the minister (or undersecretary) plays a leading role in both these processes. 
However, we believe that this political-administrative relationship does matter for 
ministerial turnover in some form. The parliament can most certainly pressure a minister by 
being distrustful or support a minister by still having a foundation of trust, but the results 
showed that this does not work in every case. In the end, it is still the minister herself that 
decides if she resigns, even if she feels pressured by (parts of) the parliament.  
Lastly, as far as de-autonomization – a subject that is understudied – we believe that 
the third layer of principal-agent relations that van Thiel and Yesilkagit (2011) described, is a 
great starting point in attempting to understand this fairly rare process. We saw that the role of 
the parliament does not matter that much in this respect. We found that the relationship 
between the minister or undersecretary and quango is of greater importance when it comes to 
repositioning of quangos, than the trust that the parliament has in a minister, because in the 
cases that we studied the undersecretaries had the leading role in this process.  
7.2   Ministerial performance 
The analysis of ministerial performance provided results that support our fourth hypothesis. 
The hypothesis stated that good ministerial performance would make it less likely for a 
minister to resign, supposedly because the parliament would give the minister the benefit of 
the doubt (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2008: 170). Considering that the cases with bad 
ministerial performance are the cases where the undersecretary and ministers resigned 
(Schiphol-fire and ProRail), while ministerial turnover did not occur in the cases that showed 
good ministerial performance (Tax Administration and Pgb-debacle), we confirm hypothesis 
4. We found that a minister with good ministerial performance is more likely to get the benefit 
of the doubt from the parliament, especially from the coalition parties. 
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7.3   Tainted ministers and timing 
Dewan and Myatt (2007: 64) argued that tainted ministers (ministers that were involved in 
incidents in the past) would be more likely to resign than clean ministers (ministers with a 
“clean record”). Hypothesis 1 stated that a minister would be more likely to resign if she was 
tainted. We saw that Mansveld and Donner were tainted and resigned, while Wiebes and van 
Rijn were clean and did not resign. The principle of clean and tainted ministers, as described 
by Dewan and Myatt (2007), therefore can explain ministerial turnover in these four cases. 
As Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding (2007: 248) brought forward, the number of 
scandals (the taintedness of a minister) can be influenced by time; the longer a minister is 
assigned, the more time there is for scandals or incidents to occur and taint the minister. 
During our analysis we saw evidence which confirmed that time influences the status of a 
minister. We saw that Wiebes was only assigned one year before he introduced Switch – he 
was clean. Mansveld and Donner were both assigned for three year, which is long considering 
that a government term lasts four years in the Netherlands. The pgb-debacle, again, showed 
contradictory results. However, considering that three of the four cases show results that 
support the assumption, we state that the status of a minister can be influenced by the time of 
her tenure. 
 The literature about ministerial characteristics, such as ministerial performance  
(Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2008) and the principal of tainted and clean ministers 
(Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding, 2007), proved to be useful in this study, because we clearly 
identified these concepts in the cases. Consequently, we confirmed the hypotheses about these 
concepts. In studying ministerial turnover, theories that are aimed at the power of the minister 
proved to have great explanatory power. For de-autonomization these ministerial 
characteristics are less important, but the role of the minister in this process proved to be 
greater than we expected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 55 
Annie Svanishvili  To give up or to step up?  Leiden University 
8   Conclusion 
We started this study to examine the role of the parliament in increased control over quangos 
and ministers after bad performance or incidents with these semi-autonomous organizations. 
We assumed that the parliament has a great amount of influence over the faith of ministers 
and quangos, because the parliament controls the government. We formulated the following 
research question: How can dynamics in the relationship between parliament and parent 
ministries because of an incident with a quango, explain far-reaching consequences for the 
responsible minister and the quango after that incident? 
 During the course of the study we found that three of our hypotheses were confirmed 
and the other three were rejected. Starting with ministerial turnover we found that the notion 
of tainted and clean minister applied to the cases; the ministers that were tainted decided to 
resign (Mansveld and Donner), while the clean ministers stayed and solved the problems with 
the quango they were responsible for (Wiebes and van Rijn). It stood out, that in the cases that 
did not show ministerial turnover, other important members of the quango were laid off, 
perhaps as a signal to the public to ensure such bad performance was not being tolerated. So, 
from the study we can conclude that there was always someone being held responsible for the 
errors of the quango. 
 We can further conclude that low levels of trust did not automatically dismiss 
ministerial turnover, but can give a minister a feeling of support. On the other hand, we saw 
that distrust was also a sufficient condition for ministerial turnover. We conclude that distrust 
from the parliament is not necessary for ministerial turnover, but can certainly contribute to 
resignation of ministers after bad performance of the quango they oversee, just as low levels 
of trust can contribute to the decision of a minister to not resign. 
 To round off the issue of ministerial turnover, we conclude that good ministerial 
performance can help a minister to increase the level of trust that the parliament has in her, 
restoring the trust of the parliament. It appeared that taking full accountability for an incident 
is especially valuable for the parliament. This way the minister can ensure her position during 
uncertain times as a consequence of badly performing quangos.  
 Continuing to the issue of de-autonomization, we saw that both hypotheses were 
rejected; the level of trust – either low levels of trust (skepticism) or distrust (assured belief 
about negative or harmful intentions) – does not explain this process. We found that it is not 
the relationship between the parliament and the minister that matters the most for de-
autonomization, but the relationship between the minister and the quango. The minister or 
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undersecretary (the one that is accountable for the quango) eventually takes on the leading 
role in this process. Therefore, we see that the whole multi-layered relationship matters when 
studying far-reaching consequences of problematic quangos.  
 With this information we can answer the research question in two ways. Firstly, we 
can state that the relationship between the parliament and parent ministries explains 
ministerial turnover to a certain extent. Having a foundation of trust (which means that low 
levels of trust are dominant over distrust) does not necessarily mean that the minister will not 
resign when an incident occurs, but it can assure the minister that she is backed up. Distrust 
can influence the decision of a minister to resign, especially if the minister is tainted and does 
not perform well during important debates – has bad ministerial performance.  
We must, however, conclude that the minister has more control about his own faith 
than we initially thought. In three of the four cases (except the Schiphol-fire), some Members 
of Parliament questioned if the undersecretaries should resign but in the end only one of these 
three undersecretaries did, which is Mansveld. Ministerial turnover has more to do with the 
minister herself; her performance during debates, whether or not she has been involved with 
incidents in the past, her motivation and her own assessment about whether or not she can be 
held accountable for the incident.  
 With regard to de-autonomization, the dynamics in the relationship between 
parliament and parent ministries do not give a clear explanation to  this process, as we initially 
thought considering that the minister accounts for the quango and is held accountable by the 
parliament. One the one hand, we saw that Wiebes tried to show the parliament that he was 
taking control over the quango after some tough debates with the parliament, by carrying out 
a de-autonomization process. On the other hand, we saw that a good relationship between the 
parliament and the minister – as we saw in the case of the Schiphol-fire and the pgb-debacle – 
can motivate the minister to put more effort in steering the quango with the autonomous 
structure that it has. So the relationship between the parliament and the minister can either 
contribute to de-autonomization, or help to prevent it, depending on the assessment of the 
minister about the situation with the quango. 
 To conclude, the parliament can pressure the minister into providing answers and 
solving the problems, but in the end the relationship of the quango with the minister herself 
has more to do with the eventual de-autonomization, than the relationship that the minister has 
with the parliament. If the former relationship is characterized by bad communication and 
cooperation, then it is likely that de-autonomization will become an option for the minister, in 
order to increase control, prevent further damage and improve the steering of the quango. 
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 Because this research is small-scale by focusing on only four cases, the results are not 
representative for all quangos and all ministers. In order to be more certain about the results – 
that the parliament has a rather facilitative role in ministerial turnover and that the relationship 
between the minister and the quango matters more for de-autonomization – more cases that 
show these kind of political and organizational changes should be analyzed.  
 In other studies about the relationship between quangos and their principal(s) we often 
see that quantitative research methods are used (see for example: van Thiel and van der Wal, 
2010; van Thiel and Yesilkagit, 2011), which lead to great representative results. From this 
study, we can conclude that qualitative research methods also offer great insight in this 
relationship, and its influence on ministerial turnover and de-autonomization. Therefore, we 
believe that mixed methods could be a great step into clarifying and understanding complex 
phenomena that come with this new way of organizing public tasks and delegating 
responsibilities. 
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Appendix 1 – Number of debates and time between debates 
Debates  
 Number of debates  Time between debates 
ProRail Regarding ProRail problems 
+ turnover of 
undersecretaryMansveld: 8 
debates 
- January 31st 2013 – Kritisch 
rapport ProRail 
- April 22nd  2014 – 
Veiligheid van het 
railvervoer 
- October 1st 2014 – Spoor: 
vervoer- en beheerplan 
- March 9th 2015 – Verslag 
Algemeen Overleg over 
Spoor 
- April 28th 2015 – Spoor 
- September 10th 2015  
- September 29th 2015 – 
ProRail debat 
- October 28th 2015 – 
Aftreden staatssecretaris 
Infrastructuur en Milieu 
- October 28th 2015 – 
Begroting Infrastructuur en 
Milieu 
Regarding repositioning of 
ProRail: 8 debates 
- December 3rd 2015 – 
Algemeen overleg over 
ProRail 
- December 17th 2015 – VAO 
 
 
 
 
 
     65 weeks 
 
 
     23 weeks  
 
     23 weeks  
 
 
     7 weeks  
     19 weeks 
      3 weeks  
 
      4 weeks 
 
 
      0 weeks 
 
 
 
 
     5 weeks 
 
 
     2 weeks 
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ProRail  (AO d.d. 03/12) 
- June 22nd 2016 – Positie 
ProRail 
- October 27th 2016 – Spoor-        
vervoer- en beheerplan 
- November 3rd 2016 – 
Begroting Infrastructuur en 
Milieu  
- December 15th 2016 – 
Voorlopige conclusies positie 
ProRail 
- December 20th 2016 – 
Verslag van algemeen 
overleg over: Spoor. 
- December 22nd 2016 – 
VAO Spoor  (AO d.d. 27/10 
en 20/12) 
     27 weeks 
 
 
  18 weeks 
 
     1 week 
 
 
     6 weeks 
 
 
     1 week 
 
 
     0 weeks (2 days) 
Tax Administration 10 debates 
- October 15th 2015 – 
Algemeen Overleg over 
Belastingdienst 
- June 1st 2016 – Algemeen 
Overleg over Belastingdienst 
- October 5th 2016 – 
Algemene Financiele 
Beschouwingen 
- October 13th 2016 – 
Investeringsagenda 
Belastingdienst  
- November 2nd 2016 – 
Investeringsagenda 
Belastingdienst 
(voortzetting) 
 
 
 
 
     32 weeks 
 
     18 weeks 
 
 
     1 week 
 
 
     3 weeks 
 
 
 
     6 weeks 
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- December 15th 2016 – 
Algemeen Overleg 
Belastingdienst 
- January 19th 2017 - VAO 
Belastingdienst 
- February 2nd 2017 – 
Investeringsagenda 
Belastingdienst 
- February 8th 2017 - VAO 
Investeringsagenda 
Belastingdienst 
 
 
 
     5 weeks 
 
     2 weeks 
 
 
     1 week 
 
 
Schiphol-fire 8 debates 
- October 27th 2005  
- November 1st 2005 – 
Mondelinge vragenuur 
- November 10th 2005 – 
Debat over de opvang van de 
slachtoffers van de brand in 
het detentiecentrum Schiphol 
- November 17th 2005 – 
Algemeen Overleg  
- November 23th 2005 – 
Debat naar aanleiding van 
Algemeen Overleg op 17 
november 2005 
- January 31st 2006 - 
Debat over de uitzetting van 
de slachtoffers van de 
Schipholbrand 
- April 11th 2006 – 
Mondelinge vragenuur de 
heer Vos 
- October 24th 2006 – 
 
 
     1 week 
 
     1 week 
 
 
 
     1 week 
 
     1 week 
 
 
 
     10 weeks 
 
 
 
     10 weeks 
 
 
     28 weeks 
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Behandeling  rapport Brand 
cellencomplex Schiphol-
Oost  
- October 25th 2006 – 
Behandeling rapport Brand 
cellencomplex Schiphol-Oost 
(voortzetting) 
- October 31st 2006 – 
Behandeling rapport Brand 
cellencomplex Schiphol-Oost 
(voortzetting) 
 
 
     0 weeks (1 day) 
 
 
 
     1 week  
Pgb-debacle 17 debates 
 - February 4th 2015 – 
Noodscenario’s voor pgb-
houders 
- February 12th 2015 – 
Persoonsgebonden budgetten 
- March 3rd 2015 – Algemeen 
Overleg  
- March 5th 2015 – 
Uitbetalingsproblematiek 
persoonsgebonden budgetten 
- March 26th 2015 - VAO 
Voortgang 
uitbetalingsproblematiek 
pgb's  
- April 29th 2015 – 
Problemen bij de Sociale 
Verzekeringsbank met 
betrekking tot de pgb’s  
- June 4th 2015 – Uitbetaling 
van de pgb’s  
- July 1st 2015 – Algemeen 
 
 
 
 
     1 week 
 
     3 weeks 
 
     0 weeks (2 days) 
 
 
     3 weeks 
 
 
 
     5 weeks 
 
 
 
     5 weeks 
 
     4 weeks 
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Overleg over voortgang 
trekkingsrechten pgb 
- September 15th 2015 – 
Algemeen Overleg over de 
voortgang trekkingsrechten 
pgb 
- December 10th 2015 – 
Algemeen Overleg over de 
voortgang trekkingsrechten 
pgb 
- March 23rd 2016 – 
Algemeen Overleg over de 
voortgang trekkingsrechten 
pgb 
- April 5th 2016 - VAO 
Voortgang trekkingsrechten 
pgb 
- June 29th 2016 – Algemeen 
Overleg over de voortgang 
trekkingsrechten pgb 
- July 7th 2016 – Algemeen 
Overleg: Voortgang 
trekkingsrechten pgb 
- December 21st 2016 – 
Algemeen Overleg over de 
voortgang trekkingsrechten 
pgb  
- December 22nd 2016 – 
Algemeen Overleg 
Voortgang trekkingsrechten 
pgb 
- February 23rd 2017 – 
Algemeen Overleg: 
Berichtgeving regie 
 
 
     11 weeks 
 
 
 
     12 weeks 
 
 
 
     15 weeks 
 
 
      
     2 weeks 
 
 
     13 weeks 
 
 
     2 weeks 
 
 
     23 weeks 
 
 
 
     0 weeks (1 day) 
 
 
 
     9 weeks 
 71 
Annie Svanishvili  To give up or to step up?  Leiden University 
invoering pgb-trekkingsrecht 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 72 
Annie Svanishvili  To give up or to step up?  Leiden University 
Appendix 2 – Example coding in NVivo (Tax Administration) 
